Those Who Oppress Their Own Subjects Will Also Lose the War. Violence in the Argumentative Strategies of the Estates in the Duchy of Prussia (1648–1649)

Abstract

Preventing violence and not oneself inflicting it on one’s subjects without good cause was an important norm for rulers in the early modern period. The article examines how the estates of the Duchy of Prussia documented violations of this norm and incorporated them into their argumentation towards their ruler, Frederick William of Brandenburg. The latter had sent troops into the territory to prospectively assist Poland against the Cossack revolt and demanded their financing by the Prussian estates. Drawing on records of the estates’ assembly from 1648–1649, the article shows how the degree, specificity, and discursive role of violence in the estates’ argumentation increased over time, enhancing its persuasiveness. Delegitimising the violence committed by the Elector’s troops enabled the estates to begin to challenge the ruler’s response to the threat (foreign soldiers being more violent than the territorial militia; attacks on local rules and authorities). Subsequently, when the ruler’s administration escalated the debate by employing the argument of necessitas, it enabled the estates to question this declared purpose itself (a state of emergency is invalid if it creates another emergency; morally corrupt soldiers will also fail in battle).
Tracing these argumentative paths, however, reveals that the estates eventually refrained from using their strongest arguments. They chose to de-escalate because of the asymmetrical structure of the communication, which had been reinforced by a display of emotions by the ruler, threats to persecute those responsible, and attacks on the estates’ honour. Although a discursive defence against the argument of necessitas could be built up (in this case through the delegitimisation of violence), holding the ruler responsible for violence proved to have clear limits.