



Theatrum historiae 36 (2025)

DOI:10.46585/th.2025.36.04

Božena Viková-Kunětická and Fascism: Between Reason and Strife¹

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Abstract: *This study explores Božena Viková-Kunětická's relationship with inter-war fascism. Starting out from an analysis of her journalism and speeches, it traces this relationship on two levels. On the first it reconstructs Viková-Kunětická's sympathies with fascism as a new political phenomenon and her relationship with the emerging proto-fascist and fascist organisations in Czechoslovakia. In the second section it seeks an answer to the question concerning the extent to which elements of fascist ideology are present in her thought and rhetoric – specifically populist ultranationalism and the myth of palingenesis. The conclusion then focuses on an interpretation of the causes of her partial inclination towards fascism.*

Keywords: *Božena Viková-Kunětická, Fascism, Nationalism, Czechoslovak National Democracy, First Czechoslovak Republic*

The figure of Božena Viková-Kunětická,² the first elected female Member of Parliament not only in the Czech lands but in Western, Southern, and Eastern Europe, has attracted interest from scholars across a range of disciplines. They frequently emphasise her precedence, her literary output oriented towards the issue of women in

1 The text was compiled as part of the project SV FF UHK 2104/2024: Božena Viková-Kunětická and fascism: between reason and strife.

2 Božena Viková-Kunětická (1862–1934), a writer and politician. In her prose and drama work she focused on the status of women within 19th-century society, her most famous novels including *Justýna Holdanová* and *Medřická*. In 1927 she was appointed as a member of the Czech Academy of Sciences and Arts for her literary production. She entered politics before the First World War, in the period 1909–1917 she was a member of the executive committee of the Young Czechs party, and she was elected to the Bohemian Diet as a Member of Parliament in a byelection in 1912 (the Czech lands were historically the third country to have a female Member of Parliament, after Finland and Norway). She adopted a stance of radical Czech nationalism, and as a result refused to contribute to the activities of the international women's movement. After the First World War she sat in the Revolutionary National Assembly, where she represented the Czechoslovak National Democracy under the leadership of Karel

society, and her related political activity.³ At the same time they acknowledge her radical nationalism and her positive relationship with inter-war fascism, both as an individual and as part of a group.⁴ She was a member of the Czechoslovak National Democracy, whose sympathies with the fascist movement have already been described in part by historians.⁵ However, assertions regarding Viková-Kunětická's links with Czech fascism are not supported by more detailed analyses. The objective of this article is therefore to reconstruct certain aspects of this relationship.⁶ The relationship is of a dual character: a) practical, in which both subjects come together either in direct (physical) or indirect contact (in the form of verbal support), or b) ideologically, in which the currents of thought intersect. Through an analysis of Viková-Kunětická's activities, publications, and public appearances in the period 1918–1934 I shall attempt to provide answers to two fundamental questions; What was her stance towards fascism and the fascist-inspired organisations that

Kramář. After 1925 her political career was limited to the internal party agenda and public speaking. Towards the end of her life she lived in seclusion with her daughter in the chateau at Libočany near Žatec. Ideologically, she was close to radical nationalism, antisemitism, and the idea of pan-Slavism; she stood in opposition not only to the President of the Czechoslovak Republic, Tomáš G. Masaryk, but also to the majority discourse of the First Czechoslovak Republic.

- 3 Her literary activity in connection with the issue of the status of women has been investigated in, among others, the following studies: Libuše HECZKOVÁ, *Cesta světla? Matriarchát Boženy Vikové-Kunětické*, in: Petra Hanáková – Libuše Heczková – Eva Kalivodová (eds.), *V bludném kruhu. Mateřství a vychovatelství jako paradoxy modernity*, Praha 2006, pp. 38–49; Marie NEUDORFLOVÁ-LACHMANOVÁ, *České ženy v 19. století*, Praha 1999, pp. 255–299; Petra ŠTĚPÁNKOVÁ, “Když jdu, tak jdu.” *Nezadržitelná Božena Viková-Kunětická*, in: *V bludném kruhu*, pp. 14–37. Her political activity and nationalism are dealt with in: Petra JEŽKOVÁ, “Božena, bojovná žena”. *Nacionalistický radikalismus českého feminismu*, in: Marie Bahenská – Jana Malínská (eds.), *Ženy a politika (1890–1938)*, Praha 2014, pp. 83–91; Hana ŽELEZNÁ, *Božena Viková-Kunětická: na konci cesty?*, in: *Ibidem*, pp. 203–212; Dana MUSILOVÁ, *Z ženského pohledu: Poslankyně a senátorky Národního shromáždění Československé republiky 1918–1939*, České Budějovice 2007; Jiří KOŘALKA, *Zvolení ženy do českého zemského sněmu roku 1912*, *Documenta pragensia* 13, 1996, pp. 307–320; Luboš VELEK, *První v Rakousku! Zvolení prvního poslance-ženy Boženy Vikové-Kunětické v roce 1912. Příspěvek k vývoji volebního práva a ženského hnutí v habsburské monarchii*, in: Milan Vojáček (ed.), *Reflexe a sebereflexe ženy v české národní elitě 2. poloviny 19. století*, Praha 2007, pp. 259–319. A highly valuable contribution is the set of speeches furnished with a critical introduction by Libuše HECZKOVÁ – Kateřina SVATOŇOVÁ (eds.), *Jus Suffragii: Politické projevy Boženy Vikové-Kunětické z let 1890–1926*, Praha 2012.
- 4 Brief mentions relating to Viková-Kunětická and fascism can be found in Ivo PEJČOCH, *Fašismus v českých zemích: fašistické a národněsocialistické strany a hnutí v Čechách a na Moravě 1922–1945*, Praha 2011, p. 52; Jakub DRÁBIK, *Fašismus*, Bratislava 2019, p. 405.
- 5 The issue has not been dealt with in detail. It is discussed in the greatest depth in Jan MAŘICA, *Od československé národní demokracie k Národnímu sjednocení*, Brno 2018; Jana ČECHUROVÁ, *Česká politická pravice: mezi převratem a krizí*, Praha 1999 and in the tendentious but heuristically valuable study by Vladimír FIC, *Národní sjednocení v politickém systému Československa (1930–1938): příspěvek ke kritice českého buržoazního nacionalismu*, Praha 1983.
- 6 I intentionally omit any simplifying assertion based on equating a member of the Czechoslovak National Democracy with a fascist sympathiser. This perspective pertains to the historiography propagated under the “normalisation” regime. See V. FIC, *Národní sjednocení*, 1983.

emerged within the Czechoslovak Republic after 1921? What elements of fascist ideology are present within Viková-Kunětická's thought?⁷

I believe that finding an answer to the umbrella question concerning the causes of her sympathies with Czech fascism will help identify the factors that motivated her (as a member of the intellectual elite) support for the Czech fascist movement and her identification with its ideology. I consider such a conclusion to be relevant to further research on fascism as a socio-cultural phenomenon in the Czech environment. Viková-Kunětická offers herself as one of the appropriate starting points, as she stood outside the official fascist current but was already associated with it during her lifetime.⁸

Fascism, the key concept of this study, became a subject of debate almost immediately after Mussolini's rise to prominence. Its nature has been contested by both public intellectuals and academics, often reflecting ideological biases rather than objective analysis. Early attempts to define fascism frequently blurred the line between scholarship and political activism, with some interpretations serving polemical or apologetic purposes. For this reason they can hardly be considered scientific definitions of the modern type. The post-war debates already fulfil this condition.⁹ The first contribution to the debate between

7 In formulating these questions, I have attempted to avoid a tabloid approach and the option of a yes/no answer. In the case of the issue under investigation I do not consider such an approach to be beneficial. The first question is consciously formulated unilaterally, the limited space not allowing for a discussion of bilateral interaction.

8 With regard to the terminology, it is important to answer the question as to whether it is possible to speak of Czechoslovak, Czech, or Slovak fascism in the inter-war period. The rhetoric and ideology of the representatives of the established organisations declaring allegiance to or manifesting elements of fascism within the Czech part of the state supported the theory of Czechoslovakism. They attempted to attract Slovak representatives into their ranks, but the overwhelming majority of their members were Czechs. By contrast, the representatives of the Slovak Rodobrana, termed a fascist movement by historians, were advocates of Slovak autonomy/independence. These two groups came into conflict, for example when the National Fascist Community attempted to extend its influence within the territory of Slovakia. It encountered resistance, being labelled a "Czech import" and an opponent of Slovak autonomy. The differentiation between the Czech and Slovak groups therefore exists both in ideological terms and within the membership base. For the purposes of clarity, I shall use the term "Czech fascism" to refer to organisations established within the Czech part of the state, in which it is important to take into account their Czechoslovakism. Ultimately, Božena Viková-Kunětická too was a convinced adherent of this theory, but in her speeches she frequently substituted adjectives. Incidentally, this also applies to other representatives of the Czechoslovak National Democracy. On this issue see Anton HRUBOŇ et al., *Fašizmus náš slovenský: Korene, podoby a reflexie fašizmu na Slovensku (1919–1945)*, Bratislava 2021, pp. 17–174 and IDEM, *Blaho vlasti – zákon nejvyšší! Národná obec fašistická a Slovensko (1926–1938)*, Ružomberok 2015.

9 A well-known definition is, for example, the one established at the VIIth Congress of the Comintern in 1935. Many examples are offered by Roger GRIFFIN (ed.), *Fascism*, Oxford 1995, pp. 247–278.

theorists of totalitarianism¹⁰ and Marxism¹¹ was made in the 1960s by Ernst Nolte in his book *Der Faschismus in seiner Epoche*,¹² and shortly afterwards this was followed up by the American historian Eugen Weber with his work *Varieties of Fascism: Doctrines of Revolution in Twentieth Century*.¹³ Although their conceptions of fascism are different, both place the emphasis on ideology, comparative research, and the search for a generic pattern – a set of characteristics intrinsic to all movements. Nolte and Weber contributed to a situation in which scholars began to treat fascism as an analytical category rather than a manifestation of nihilism or an act of a crazed dictator. Their work was followed on from by a series of authors, and approaches to fascism thus became ever more differentiated. However, no universally respected definition was established.¹⁴

It was not until the beginning of the 1990s that Roger Griffin published his book *The Nature of Fascism*,¹⁵ influenced by previous studies by Stanley Payne, George L. Moss, Zeev Sternhell, and other authors, in which he presented an ideal-type definition of fascism enabling a comparison and typology of political groups.¹⁶ He understands fascism as “*a genus of political ideology whose mythic core in its various permutations is a palingenetic*

10 Essential works on this subject are Hannah ARENDT, *The Origins of Totalitarianism*, New York 1951 or Carl J. FRIEDRICH – Zbigniew K. BRZEZINSKI, *Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy*, Cambridge 1956. From more recent production we may present the example of David D. ROBERTS, *Totalitarianism (Key Concepts in Political Theory)*, Cambridge 2020. The journal *Pamět a dějiny* devoted its fourth issue from 2023 to a general reflection on totalitarianism. A summary of the approaches was described by the authors in the relevant chapter of Radek BUBEN et al., *Diktatura a autoritářské režimy*, in: Lucie Storchová (ed.), *Koncepty a dějiny*, Praha 2014, pp. 281–307.

11 E.g. Nicos POULANTZAS, *Fascism and Dictatorship*, London 1974; Tim MASON, *The primacy of politics. Politics and economics in National Socialist Germany*, in: Jane Caplan (ed.), *Nazism, Fascism and the Working Class*, Cambridge 1995, pp. 53–76. For further details on the development of the Marxist perspective see Ian KERSHAW, *The Nazi Dictatorship: Problems and Perspectives of Interpretation*, London 2000, pp. 47–68. Also: Roger GRIFFIN (ed.), *International Fascism: Theories, Causes and the New Consensus*, Oxford 1998, pp. 42–45, 59–100.

12 In English translation *Three Faces of Fascism*, in Czech as *Fašismus ve své epoše*, Praha 1999.

13 Eugen WEBER, *Varieties of Fascism: Doctrines of Revolution in the Twentieth Century*, New York 1964.

14 On the development of fascist studies within an international framework see Aristotle A. KALLIS (ed.), *The Fascism Reader*, New York 2003; Constantin IORDACHI (ed.), *Comparative Fascist Studies: New Perspectives*, London 2010, and James A. GREGOR, *Interpretations of Fascism*, New York 1997. On the Czechoslovak perspective see Jakub DRÁBIK, *Pomalé překračování tradičních mezí: Fašismus v první ČR jako metodologický problém české, slovenské a československé historiografie z hlediska historiků “nového konsenzu”*, *Soudobé dějiny* 29, 2022, no. 2, pp. 381–414; Ondřej CINKAJZL, *Ke genezi komparativních fašistických studií a “novému konsenzu”*, *Securitas Imperii* 17, 2010, no. 2, pp. 106–123.

15 Roger GRIFFIN, *The Nature of Fascism*, London 1991.

16 We may present as examples Stanley PAYNE, *Fascism: Comparison and Definition*, Madison 1983; George L. MOSSE, *The Fascist Revolution: Toward a General Theory of Fascism*, Madison 2021; Zeev STERNHELL, *Neither Right Nor Left: Fascist Ideology in France*, Princeton 1996. For a comprehensive discussion on sources see Roger GRIFFIN, *Fascism: An Introduction to Comparative Fascist Studies*, Cambridge 2018.

*form of populist ultra-nationalism.*¹⁷ The core of the ideology, conceived in the spirit of Micheal Freedén's theory,¹⁸ is the myth of palingenesis/rebirth within a community that is in a state of regression. This regression or stagnation is caused by enemies of various types: communists, Jews, or the system of parliamentary democracy. In opposition to this situation fascists mobilise the populist forces of the nation, which for them represent the supreme value and source of power. Ultrnationalism demarcates who belongs to the national community, and the prefix "ultra" refers to its opposition to liberal and democratic institutions. Fascism, which Griffin terms a revolutionary ideology, aspires to create a new world purged of all enemies. The author also presumes the existence of various national permutations which, depending on the socio-cultural context, attach further political conceptions and propositions to the above-described core.¹⁹ Also among the important methodological impulses is the empathic paradigm, by means of which scholars may attempt to view the ideology through the eyes of its adherents rather than its opponents,

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- 17 R. GRIFFIN, *The Nature*, p. 26. The British political scientist partially amended this definition under the influence of the discussions. For example, in his book *Modernism and Fascism*, Basingstoke 2007, he presented the following conception: "*Fascism is a form of programmatic modernism which seeks to conquer political power in order to realise a totalising vision of national or ethnic rebirth. Its ultimate end is to overcome the decadence that has destroyed a sense of communal belonging and drained modernity of meaning and transcendence and usher in a new era of cultural homogeneity and health.*" In the handbook *Fascism*, 2021, however, he again operates (also in the English original) with his original definition. Unless explicitly stated, I also work with the original, narrower form.
- 18 Freedén's approach advocates the existence of a hard core of all ideologies, which is unalterable and to which expanding but secondary political conceptions are attached. For an examination of ideology, which he understands as: "[...] *a set of ideas, beliefs, opinions, and values that exhibit a recurring pattern, are held by significant groups, compete over providing and controlling plans for public policy, and do so with the aim of justifying, contesting, or changing the social and political arrangements and processes of a political community*", he proposes a morphological approach to the analysis of the individual political concepts that collectively constitute the ideology. Each political concept shall have a specific meaning, depending on the ones affiliated with it (for example, freedom within the framework of conservatism and liberalism). The author likens ideology to maps which help us form opinions, or in the case of a research approach to decode the meanings of concepts within a certain context/system. Michael FREEDÉN, *Ideologies and Political Theory: A Conceptual Approach*, Oxford 1996, or *Ideology: A Very Short Introduction*, Oxford 2003. Among other factors, Griffin writes that: "[...] *as a supra-personal structure an ideology can be pictured as a dynamic interaction of moral and political convictions, rejections of opposing values, and nuanced but converging visions of an ideal order of society and the policies to achieve it, all of which are capable of formulation at a high level of theoretical analysis. However, the extraordinary normative power of ideology, which is manifested historically in its ability to serve as the rationale of behaviour, the basis of social cohesion, the legitimisation of a particular political regime and the inspiration of revolutionary action, is rooted in sub-rational and pre-verbal layers of consciousness within the individual and may express itself in a wide variety of both verbal and non-verbal cultural phenomena.*" R. GRIFFIN, *The Nature*, 1991, p. 17.
- 19 German national socialism emerges from this as a very strong version of fascist ideology. The author summarised his conclusions in Roger GRIFFIN, *A Fascist Century: Essays by Roger Griffin*, New York 2008, pp. 70–116.

thereby capturing a different image of the phenomenon that is being examined.²⁰ Griffin's method differs from previous approaches rooted in totalitarianism, the Marxist view of fascism as a reactionary force, and other models of generic fascism in its emphasis on an ideological core, as well as in its conscious gravitation towards a comparative analysis and its methodological empathy. Although Griffin boldly referred to his theory as a "new consensus" of fascist studies, it in fact became the object of numerous controversies.²¹ These have permeated into the Czecho-Slovak environment particularly thanks to Slovak scholars (namely Jakub Drábik and Anton Hruboň), who, through a simultaneous application and criticism of Griffin's concept, have demonstrated its contribution to our own historiography too.²²

Sceptics have criticised Griffin's tendencies towards essentialism, since he ignores a whole series of aspects that are of crucial significance to other scholars. He does not reflect sufficiently upon the differences between the individual movements. According to Paxton, Griffin's model does not enable us to trace the development of ideology in relation to power (differentiation between a movement and a regime).²³ It is static, and focuses excessively on the ideological foundations of fascism.²⁴ Griffin in fact entirely neglects corporatism and the economic aspects of fascism that have been so emphasised by some historians.²⁵ At the same time, the phenomenon of violence and the cult of the leader also

20 This difference is clearly visible upon a comparison of the positions of Roger Griffin and the British Marxist David Renton. The latter upholds the view that the objective of investigating fascism is to show its "dark" side and prevent its further spread. From this position he then criticises liberal historians working with the empathic paradigm. See David RENTON, *Fascism: Theory and Practice*, London 1999, and more recently *Fascism: History and Theory*, London 2020.

21 By using the phrase "new consensus" Griffin refers to what he regards as the ever greater degree of acceptance of the ultranationalist palingenesis as a component of fascist ideology. He refers to this concept as a frequent element in the definitions of other scholars.

22 Drábik and Hruboň applied Griffin's observations in their research into the activities of Hlinka's Slovak People's Party, the regime of the Slovak state, and the foremost representatives of Czech fascism, the National Fascist Community. At the same time, they both focused on a detailed criticism of the approach, which is complemented by a contemporary study based in the Czech environment by Ondřej Cinkajzl (see note no. 5). E.g. J. DRÁBIK, *Fašizmus*, 2019; Anton HRUBOŇ et al., *Fašizmus náš slovenský*, Bratislava 2021; IDEM, *Fašistický mýtus znovuzrodenia v kontexte ideológie Národnej obce fašistickej a Rodobraný*, Český časopis historický 113, 2015, no. 2, pp. 454–485.

23 In his publication the American political scientist delineated five stages of fascism, and from this position criticised the limited application of Griffin's model to the dynamic essence of fascism as a political movement. Robert O. PAXTON, *The Anatomy of Fascism*, New York 2004.

24 An indirectly critical approach not only to Griffin, but to generic fascism in general is presented in David D. ROBERTS, *Fascist Interactions: Proposals for a New Approach to Fascism and Its Era, 1919–1945*, New York 2016 or António COSTA PINTO (ed.), *Rethinking the Nature of Fascism*, Basingstoke 2011.

25 This concept is investigated, for example, in the publication by António COSTA PINTO (ed.), *Corporatism and Fascism: The Corporatist Wave in Europe*, London 2017, or in the Costa Pinto's chapter in *Rethinking*, pp. 87–120.

appear to be sidelined.²⁶ The argument regarding the inadequate delineation of key terms nationalism, populism, or revolution, may appear unnecessary, but the terminological looseness here may prove to be problematic in academic practice.²⁷

It is not the focus of this study to present and respond to all the objections raised since the 1990s, though it is important to justify my inspiration by Griffin's approach.²⁸ I shall base my argument upon a comparison with three other approaches that may be applied to the research framework in question. The first of these is Roger Eatwell's model. He also deals with fascism as an ideology, though he attempts to overcome the abstraction and excessive emphasis on affectivity that Griffin has been criticised for. The matrix that is offered stands upon a foundation of three postulates (the new man, the nation, the state) and on their concretised subcategories. According to Eatwell, fascism is "*An ideology that strives to forge social rebirth based on a holistic-national radical Third Way, though in practice fascism has tended to stress style, especially action and the charismatic leader, more than a detailed programme, and to engage in a Manichean demonisation of its enemies.*"²⁹ By placing the palingenetic myth at the centre of his definition, Griffin came closer to the concept of political religion. Another methodological starting point is the work of the Italian historian Emilio Gentile. In comparison with his British colleagues, he defined fascism in greater detail. Although by taking account of totalitarianism he shared elements in common

26 Jakub Drábik comments on this objection in J. DRÁBIK, *Fašizmus*, pp. 46–52. He ultimately decided to include violence as part of his own definition.

27 Griffin provides a concretisation in *The Nature of Fascism*, 1993, on pp. 32–37. Although he defines ultranationalism, which he understands as a type of nationalism that rejects any kind of liberal institutions following on from the traditions of Enlightenment humanism, he leaves aside "mere" nationalism as a pre-stage of the term he uses. Yet greater variability is offered by the interpretation of the adjective "populist". In the same book he explains the term as an instance when a movement must take as its foundation the nation as the social group from which all power and right to govern ensue. He therefore applies the term as it was presented to the world by the American and later the Great French Revolution. In another publication (*Fascism*, 2018), he employs this expression to refer to political strategies and practices that are intended to mobilise populist/folk forces for the purpose of revolutionary regeneration. In the definition presented below I incline rather towards this second conception, because the nation (of a mass character) as a source of power, at least during the 19th century and in the inter-war period, was the essence of nationalist ideology. As a criterion defining the fascist movement, populism therefore appears to be essential. The mobilising nature of this term is therefore closer to my perception of the political practice of fascism.

28 A comprehensive critique of the "new consensus" is presented in the anthology Roger GRIFFIN – Werner LOH – Andreas UMLAND (eds.), *Fascism Past and Present: West and East*, Stuttgart 2006.

29 See Roger EATWELL, *The Nature of "Generic Fascism": The "Fascist Minimum" and the "Fascist Matrix"*, in: Christian Ioardachi (ed.), *Comparative Fascist Studies: New Perspectives*, New York 2010, pp. 136–162. The author is active in this issue and has also dealt with it in IDEM, *Towards a New Model of Generic Fascism*, *Journal of Theoretical Politics* 4, 1992, no. 2, pp. 161–194; IDEM, *Fascism: A History*, New York 1997 or IDEM – Matthew GOODWIN, *National Populism: The Revolt Against Liberal Democracy*, New York 2018. A comparison of the above works enables us to follow the development of Eatwell's stance.

with other approaches, the sacralisation of politics makes his conception a highly specific model.³⁰ Following on from the reflections of other authors, David Roberts presented an entirely different approach. In his book *Fascist Interactions*, he criticises the emphasis on the search for a fascist minimum and typology, neglecting the dynamics of the relationships that cut across the inter-war political right. He proposes a new, looser research framework focused on the interactions between fascist, authoritarian, and conservative regimes. He returns to totalitarianism as the primary category of definition, employing this term to denote the principle of thought concerning the ordering of society, offering a solution to the challenges associated with the bypassing of liberal democracy.³¹ His definition is the loosest.³²

All four models work with a cognitive component and with political thought. On the other hand, they differ in the degree of specificity of the definition, or in the case of Roberts in the research framework. Griffin's interpretation, founded upon the core of fascism in the form of palingenetic ultranationalism, strikes me as the best starting point for my own approach, because it is sufficiently brief and concentrates only on ideology. As a consequence, it can be expanded or adapted further.³³ Essentialism, objected to at

30 Gentile defines fascism as follows: "*Fascism is a modern political phenomenon, which is nationalistic and revolutionary, anti-liberal and anti-Marxist, organised in the form of a militia party, with a totalitarian conception of politics and the State, with an ideology based on myths; virile and anti-hedonist, it is sacralised in a political religion affirming the absolute primacy of the nation understood as an ethnically homogenous organic community, hierarchically organised into a corporate State, with a bellicose mission to achieve grandeur, power, and conquest with the ultimate aim of creating a new order and a new civilisation.*" See Emilio GENTILE, *Fascism, Totalitarianism and Political Religion: Definitions and Critical Reflections on Criticism of an Interpretation*, in: Roger Griffin (ed.), *Fascism, Totalitarianism and Political Religion*, London 2005, p. 35. See also IDEM, *Politics as Religion: Between Democracy and Totalitarianism*, Princeton 2006; IDEM, *The Sacralization of Politics: Definitions, Interpretations and Questions of Secular Religion and Totalitarianism*, in: Christian Ioardachi (ed.), *Comparative Fascist Studies: New Perspectives*, New York 2010, pp. 257–289. An entire section is devoted to this topic in the monograph in question.

31 "In principle I use totalitarianism to indicate a sense of challenge, opportunity, and responsibility that can appear only at a historically specified moment. In the light of the modern configuration, which appeared to demand a new way of collective bargaining, it was essential to overcome liberal democracy through the expansion of state sovereignty, in principle without limitation, and by engaging the people by means of more permanent and more direct participation [...]" David D. ROBERTS, *Fascism and the Framework for Interactive Political Innovation during the Era of Two World Wars*, in: António Costa Pinto (ed.), *Rethinking*, p. 50. His approach illustrates the return of certain historians to a theory of totalitarianism devoid of political function.

32 D. D. ROBERTS, *Fascist Interactions*, 2016 or A. COSTA PINTO (ed.), *Rethinking*, 2011.

33 This is ultimately demonstrated by Eatwell and Gentile, who did not break away from the myth of palingenesis and the search for a new world. They are distinguished from Griffin by the degree of emphasis on this conception (which for them is not central) and their taking into account the political strategies of fascism directly in the definition. Both therefore come close to the positions of the historians of the "new consensus".

other times, may upon careful consideration be an actual advantage if the aim is to identify fascism within the thought of an individual or group. In other words, if Griffin's definition reflects the core of fascist ideology, it may represent a building block of the historian's method without necessarily being his or her only tool. In the search for the ideological intersections between fascism and the figure of Viková-Kunětická, I shall confine myself to the fascist core alone: the palingenetic myth and populist ultranationalism, and as far as possible deal only peripherally with its relationship towards violence and the cult of the leader.

If I start out from Griffin's original definition, as well as the one modified by Drábik, and reflect upon the objections that are of fundamental importance for my purpose, I understand the term "fascism" to cover a political ideology, a type of revolutionary populist ultranationalism with obsessive visions of the breakdown of society, decadence, and national disgrace, whose aim is to achieve a rebirth in the name of the nation by means of purging it of its enemies, by achieving the integration of all its elements, and by the creation of a new (totalitarian) social order. Fascists apply political theories in order to achieve a goal, as well as strategies such as racism (giving their ideological enemy a physical form), violence, and proposals for a new social order (corporatism). The practical part is always chosen depending on the historical-cultural context, thus giving birth to the national permutations of the one ideal type.³⁴

I divide the study into three sections. In the first I shall discuss Viková-Kunětická's relationship to the Czech fascist movement and specify which organisations can be referred to as fascist. Next, I will focus on an analysis of the source materials with the aim of identifying the presence of fascist ideology in the thought and practice of this Czechoslovak

34 By means of a definition conceived in this manner I attempt to express the essence of the ideological core of fascism, which is anti-liberal nationalism based upon the nation as an abstract unit from which political power evolves. At the same time, I wish to make clear the difference between theory and practice/affiliated concepts; the second item creates national variants. In other words, corporatism is not a necessity, but rather a tool in the building of the new order. Racism need not be ever-present, but may be of use in defining the boundary of the nation. For these purposes I regard antisemitism as a form of racism. See Nira YUVAL-DAVIS, *Antisemitism is a Form of Racism – or is it?*, *Sociology* 58, 2023, no. 4, pp. 779–795; Ali RATANSI, *Racism: VSI*, Oxford 2020; Steven BELLER, *Antisemitism: VSI*, Oxford 2015; George L. MOSSE, *The Fascist Revolution*, New York 2000, pp. 55–68. On the relationship between racism and antisemitism see also J. DRÁBIK, *Fašizmus*, pp. 31–37. It is crucial also to define nationalism in its non-aggressive form. I understand this term to cover an ideology, political movement aspiring to gain and maintain autonomy, unity, and identity in the name of the population, some of whose members consider it a real or potential nation. An adherent of this school shares notions that humanity is divided into nations, each with its own specific character, that the nation is a source of political power, that each nation has the right to its own autonomy and sovereignty, and that global peace can be built only upon the plurality of free nations. Here I combine the conceptions presented in John BREUILLY, *Nationalism and the State*, Manchester 1982 and Anthony D. SMITH, *Ethno-symbolism and nationalism: A cultural approach*, London 2009.

National Democracy politician.³⁵ In the conclusion I shall then attempt to reconstruct the causes of Viková-Kunětická's sympathies with fascism.

Viková-Kunětická's practical relationship towards fascism and its Czech form

The foundations of the Czech fascist movement were laid in 1921, when the first group to be associated with fascism, the National Movement, was established.³⁶ One year later this was joined by the Red and Whites, and in Moravia the Czechoslovak Fascists were founded. These organisations, referred to by historians, their opponents, and sometimes also by themselves as fascist, subsequently merged and in 1926 formed the National Fascist Community (NOF), the foremost representative of Czech inter-war fascism. In only certain cases has Czech historiography addressed the question concerning the extent to which the above formations can be termed fascist. Some scholars classify the National Movement (NH), the Red and Whites, and the Czechoslovak Fascists rather as proto-fascist organisations which, though inspired by fascism (in terms of ideology and form of action), were not sufficiently radical and revolutionary.³⁷ The criterion was only fully met by the NOF. I shall adhere to the above-described paradigm and treat the term "proto-fascism" as a separate category which covers political subjects that, while being nationalist, using the rhetoric of social decline and national revival, and theoretically rejecting liberal democracy, do not seek to enforce revolutionary change, a mass character of the party, or the replacement of traditional elites. Such associations are frequently classified as forerunners of fully fascist parties. Despite the fact that such a claim is valid in many cases (including the NOF), proto-fascism need not always necessarily evolve into fascism.³⁸

35 The object of interest of this study is the individual and her political thought. The surviving testimony is composed primarily of journalistic texts and written speeches. In the first case it is fairly easy to determine the context and details of the publication. In the case of the second type of source, however, this does not apply, since there are several versions of the speeches, they are incomplete, and there is a lack of evidence as to whether or when they were made. To a lesser extent it has been possible to date some of the speeches with the aid of newspaper articles and literature. The documents are stored in the Literary Archive of the Museum of Czech Literature (hereinafter referred to as LA MCL), Božena Viková-Kunětická, no. arch. coll. 1878, and also the printed periodicals *Národní listy*, *Naše menšiny*, and *Nová síla*.

36 Eva FARGAŠOVÁ, *Nástin vývoje organizací českého fašistického hnutí v letech 1921–1929*, Sborník k dějinám 19. a 20. století, Praha 1989, pp. 135–161.

37 Libor Vykoupil considers the embryonic forms of Czech fascism to have been a purely intellectual movement, which he argues with reference to the absence of militant action. Libor VYKOUPILO, *Český fašismus na Moravě*, Brno 2012, p. 37.

38 Roger Griffin also operates with the term in this sense (*The Nature of Fascism*, pp. 50–51), but does not elaborate upon it in later works. Although in his book he continues to employ the term "parafascism",

Fascism was and is associated with the right wing of politics: its roots are linked with the Czechoslovak National Democracy, which is sometimes considered a fascist-leaning party. The fact is that the party's political opponents labelled the National Democrats fascists, and the same conclusions were reached by the research influenced by the normalisation regime.³⁹ However, a methodologically precise treatment of this issue is lacking. In the work produced in the period since the Velvet Revolution it is possible to identify four areas of the relationship of the ČsND towards proto-fascist and fascist groups: a) ideological intersections, especially nationalism and an attendant opposition to the Castle Group, to President Masaryk, communism, and political partisanship, b) the pragmatic deployment of fascists by the National Democrats as “megaphones and footsoldiers”, as well as in their search for sources of support following the decline of their own electoral support, c) personal sympathies; some influential members of the ČsND admired the new movements (Hlaváček, Sís, Dyk...), and d) the level of inspiration, since the party imitated fascist mobilisation and propaganda strategies (Baloun referred to this practice by the term “ideological fascism”, which was used by the National Democrats themselves).⁴⁰

Viková-Kunětická's ties to proto-fascist and fascist organisations were therefore part of a broader context. She participated actively in events they organised and expressed verbal support for them. She made appearances as a speaker at meetings of the National Movement. The Women's Provincial Organisation of the ČsND, of which she was leader, organised rallies at which representatives of these proto-fascist groups also spoke.⁴¹ Viková-

a type of regime inspired by fascism, and also presents examples of individual subjects which he classifies as non-fascist radical right (pp. 117–120), there is a lack of any clearly defined taxonomy. A familiar typology is the “three faces” of authoritarian nationalism as defined by Stanley Payne in *A History of Fascism 1914–1945*, Wisconsin 1995 (older version in *Fascism*, 1983). The triad of currents – conservative authoritarian right, radical authoritarian right, and fascism – enables scholars to establish a model that can be worked with. Within the Czech environment a similar system was introduced and applied by Pavel KOTLÁN, *Fašismus a jeho česká podoba*, Přerov 2001. For another application of the concept of proto-fascism see Pavel BALOUN, *Vznik českého fašismu*, Historie – otázky – problémy 2, 2010, no. 1, pp. 63–83; Libor VYKOUPILO, *Národní obec fašistická a český fašismus: kontext jednoho pojmu*, Dějiny a současnost 2022, no. 8, pp. 14–18, J. DRÁBIK, *Fašismus*, pp. 409–412.

- 39 On the “anti-campaign” of the time see J. MAŘICA, *Od československé národní demokracie*, Brno 2018. See also Vladimír FIC, *Národní sjednocení*, Praha 1983.
- 40 Besides the already cited publications, for classification I also worked with Eva BROKLOVÁ – Josef TOMEŠ – Michal PEHR, *Agrárníci, národní demokraté a lidovci ve druhém poločase první Československé republiky*, Praha 2008; Martina LUSTIGOVÁ, *Karel Kramář: první československý premiér*, Praha 2007; Jan RATAJ – Miloš DLOUHÝ – Antonín HÁKA, *Proti systému! český radikální konzervatismus, fašismus a nacionální socialismus 20. a 21. století*, Praha 2020; Tomáš PASÁK, *Český fašismus 1922–1945 a kolaborace 1939–1945*, Praha 1999.
- 41 I. PEJČOCH, *Fašismus*, p. 29, Archive of the Office of the President of the Czech Republic (hereinafter referred to as AKPR), f. T 636/23, box. no. 120, *Schůze nár. dem. žen o Národním hnutí konaná v Měšt. Besedě 4. V. 1923.*

Kunětická considered the main point of intersection between the National Democratic Party, the proto-fascist movements, and later the National Fascist Community to be their emphasis on the Czechoslovak nation, the idea of the nation-state, and the role of the defender of these ideas. In one of her speeches she complained that: “*Unfortunately, the nationalist stance of the party of National Democracy, the National Movement, and the Red and Whites has met with a reaction at home, and is under attack from all sides.*”⁴² She also projected the role of a kind of martyr, which she ascribed to Czech nationalism and all its sympathisers, into the Radola Gajda affair in 1926.⁴³ She asked Karel Kramář for support in resuming the proceedings and the active participation of the ČsND in the defence of the future leader of the NOF.⁴⁴ Her argument was based upon the following proposition: Gajda, formerly a national hero, was now a pariah. His case was one of social significance and must become part of the public discussion, because any success would be a victory for the nation and the state. The trial concocted by Masaryk dishonoured a man who had served his country. In her campaign to reopen the trial, Viková-Kunětická attempted to collect signatures from representatives of political parties that sympathised with nationalism and from artistic circles.⁴⁵

The reconstructed direct contact and affiliation to the same political wing documents her positive relations with figures associated with proto-fascism and fascism. The way she spoke about fascist ideology and the tasks she ascribed to it can be described with reference to an analysis of her speech from May 1926. At one of the meetings convened by the Young Generation of the ČsND she spoke in favour of accepting Czech fascism, though with an element of pan-Slavism: “*If we are to speak of fascism, we can have only our own fascism, national and Slavic fascism, fascism of national and Slavic unification, national and Slavic resistance.*”⁴⁶ At the same time she rejected inspiration by the Italian

42 LA PNP, Božena Viková-Kunětická, box no. 9, *Rozpor dvou ideových světů*.

43 In July 1926 Radola Gajda was accused of espionage and collaboration with the USSR. Although the investigating commission of the Ministry of National Defence did not acknowledge the evidence that was submitted, Gajda was eventually pensioned off upon intervention from President Masaryk. From the beginning of the next year, he then became the leader of the National Fascist Community and remained in this position until the party's activity was terminated. The case quickly attracted large-scale press coverage and was transformed into a battle between the right-wing and left-wing press. Antonín KLIMEK – Petr HOFMAN, *Vítěz, který prohrál: generál Radola Gajda*, Praha 1995.

44 She retained a boundless loyalty to Karel Kramář. She acknowledged him as the leader of the national forces and co-ordinated her activities with him. For example, in one of her letters she appealed to him to make a speech to the National Movement. National Museum Archives (ANM), f. Karel Kramář, box no. 18, inv. no. 766.

45 Ibidem.

46 AKPR, f. T 635/21, box no. 52, *Referát ze schůze svolané Mladou generací národní demokracie na 7. hod. večerní dne 31. května*. The activity of the youth organisation of the National Democracy illustrates the radicalisation of the party as a whole. Following another unsuccessful electoral performance in

model, which in her view was rooted in the national unification movement of the 19th century: “Our fascism, dear friends, is more bitter, since it has its roots in the enslavement of 300 years of serfdom, and now in the increasingly Germanophile and internationalist policy of our government.”⁴⁷ In terms of domestic politics, fascism represented a reaction to the undesirable development of Czechoslovakia, but it was not merely an instrument for its correction. Viková-Kunětická also viewed it as a solution to the situation in the Soviet Union and the restoration of Slavic Russia. She thereby transformed a mere state-based conception into an international phenomenon, in which fascism, alongside nationalism, was to become the driving force in resolving the problems of the Czech nation and the Slavic race.⁴⁸ For the above reasons, fascism represented a mobilising force which would enable the return of national, or, more precisely, Slavic ideals, and for Viková-Kunětická (and also for many other National Democrats) all its followers were welcome allies.⁴⁹

The presence of fascist ideology in the political thought of Viková-Kunětická

I shall now focus on the ideological reasons for Viková-Kunětická's fascist sympathies. In an analysis of her rhetoric and journalism I take as my starting point the above definition of fascism and focus on a number of partial motifs. In the case of populist ultranationalism I

1925, the National Democrats aligned themselves with proto-fascist groups with the aim of regaining their lost electoral support. Closer collaboration continued until the autumn of 1927, when the NOF stood independently in several places in the municipal elections. This collaboration was commented on astutely by Jan Mařica: “*The traditional post-electoral National Democratic hue of the isolated ČsND against all now took on a further dimension with a stab in the back from the NOF*” (p. 83). It is necessary to assess Viková-Kunětická's radicalism and statements within this context. J. MAŘICA, *Od Československé národní demokracie*, Brno 2018, pp. 58–83.

47 AKPR, f. T 635/21, box no. 52, *Referát ze schůze svolané Mladou generací národní demokracie na 7. hod. večerní dne 31. května*. Notions concerning the exclusivity and inimitability of Italian fascism were widespread in inter-war Czechoslovakia. In 1936 Dr. Jan Kapras, also a member of the ČsND, wrote: “Fascism is indeed a purely Italian creature, which may well suit the nature of the Italians and the entire Italian tradition, but it is not possible simply to transpose this system to other states... Fascism is the child of sunny Italy, and the so-called fascisms in other states have nothing in common with the Italian model. They are only outward forms which have adopted these imitations of fascism.” Jan KAPRAS, *Fašismus*, Praha 1936.

48 “Our fascism cannot be only a defensive movement, it must have the capacity for outward aggression. We must penetrate the consciousness that this national state is at the same time the guarantee of the great unification of the Slavic race.” Ibidem.

49 It was indeed the integrating function of fascism that was a key element. For example, one year later she called for upon the women organised within the ČsND and NOF to work together to prevent the re-election of President Masaryk. She expressed critical views regarding any internal disputes within the National Democracy and the fascist party. See LA PNP, f. Božena Viková-Kunětická, box no. 9, *Projev o vztahu k Masarykovi a Projev na volební schůzi*.

place the emphasis on nationalism as the sole, key concept, on efforts to create a nationwide movement, and on the stance towards liberal democracy. With reference to the palingenetic myth I reconstruct statements on social decay, the vision of the future, and notions of the new order established by the revolution. The reduction of the two main concepts to subcategories will enable a more detailed and clear description of Viková-Kunětická's ideology.

a) Populist ultranationalism

In her notes, Viková-Kunětická often concretised the meaning of the terms she employed. In her ideological map a central position was occupied by the nation, which: "[...] *for me is the part of man's life that provides him with the possibility of a certain self-confidence, a certain acquired power and also a certain far-reaching mission*".⁵⁰ For her the nation was an abstract metaphysical entity, from which moral and political principles (the right to autonomy) or frameworks for reflection and action (everyone must strive for the national benefit) were derived. She accentuated an orientation towards the metaphysical, and referred to this perspective with the word "idealism", the nature of which she described as follows: "[...] *the call for the triumph of the spirit over matter*".⁵¹ The political expression of this ideological current was nationalism. The system of nation-states was therefore not a mere power construct, but a condition for the desirable spiritual development of humanity.⁵² In other words, she conceived of the nation as an intangible but natural factor, representing a moral and political compass. Its spiritual nature was founded upon race. She employed this category in accordance with the tradition of the 19th century as an appellation for a whole incorporating all nations that shared specific traits, models of behaviour, and, according to Viková-Kunětická, also the same mission. Like nation, race was also a metaphysical ideal, since: "[...] *racial bonds endure as the foundations of man's capacities for development, as a solution to his distinctive rights to life, as a guarantee of his distinctive development in culture, social circulation, and in familial relations to the eternal fount of truth, love, and*

50 *Národní listy*, 1924, vol. 64, no. 49, p. 1.

51 See *Národní listy*, 1921, vol. 61, no. 78, p. 1. Idealism in the academic discourse also refers to the philosophy of the same name and its types. It is probable that its advocates from the 19th century had an influence on Viková-Kunětická. For further details see Helmut HOLZHLEY – Wolfgang RÖD, *Filosofie 19. a 20. stol. II. Novokantovství, idealismus, realismus a fenomenologie*, Praha 2006.

52 If I were to regard nationalism as a sentiment and relationship towards the nation, the idealism as presented by Viková-Kunětická would be close to this emotion. The focus on a political agenda and the definition of nationalism as an ideology (as a rule seeking to seize power) enables a separation of both levels of contemplation. For further details on this subject see LA PNP, f. Božena Viková-Kunětická, box no. 9, *Projev o českém nacionalismu*, box no. 8, *O idealismu v politice nebo šovinista*.

duty”⁵³ Race expressed the essence that determined a whole range of activities and attitudes. The conflict between the Slavs and Germans was therefore not primarily a clash of political entities, but rather ensued from the character of both tribes. Through this paradigm she also commented on political events; thus, for example, she enthusiastically described the statements of a Polish envoy: “*This is an entirely new constellation of political concepts, since we are not a nation of 10,000,000 but a part of an immense racial mass that has common duties, common laws of spiritual development, and also a common future.*”⁵⁴ The existence of race gave nationalism a higher purpose and enabled a solution to the national problem within a broader context.⁵⁵

In order to gain a comprehensive picture of Viková-Kunětická's nationalism, it is necessary also to discuss the ideas that are in contrast with it. She considered materialism to be the ideal most opposed to her worldview, represented politically by socialism and communism. She considered their mutual relationship to be one of opposite poles: idealism conceived of the nation as a unity, while materialism divided it into classes. The former emphasised the spiritual, the latter the material. She drew an insurmountable boundary between both schools of thought, because: “[...] *materialism considers itself above the ideal, and demeans humanity and the nation, as is now taking place, in the sense of lies, indolence, and corruption.*”⁵⁶ The difference was determined by the labelling of materialism and its followers as an import: “*Not a single one of these isms has grown from our soil and from our individually Slavic needs. It would therefore be to our benefit, in an endeavour to preserve the spiritual value of man, nation, and race, to avoid the new ism, so that it cannot seduce us towards its programme, its organisation, or even a certain slogan.*”⁵⁷ Whereas nation and race were organic phenomena, materialism was an invention of the modern age.⁵⁸ For the same reason she adopted a negative stance towards any attempt to transcend what she

53 LA PNP, f. Božena Viková-Kunětická, box no. 9, *Projev na volební schůzi*.

54 The envoy expressed a positive standpoint towards co-operation between Poland and Czechoslovakia, with reference to the argument of Slavic kinship. *Národní listy*, 1927, vol. 67, no. 252, p. 1.

55 I take as my theoretical foundation the work of George L. MOSSE, *Toward The Final Solution: A History of European Racism*, Madison 2020. In this the author defined two fundamental causes of the spread of racism in the 19th century: faith in the existence of primordial national groups and the spread of the spiritualist movement. Viková-Kunětická also felt a close affinity with the latter, describing her sessions with mediums and the influence of spiritualism in her book *Z cest: obrázky a studie (1894–1912)*, Praha 1919, pp. 61–114.

56 Ibidem.

57 Ibidem.

58 Zeev Sternhell considers an opposition to materialism to be one of the fundamentals of the fascist perspective: “*In its essential character, fascist ideology was a rejection of the value known in the culture of the time as materialism. For fascism, liberalism, which at the end of the nineteenth century developed into liberal democracy, and Marxism, a branch of which was democratic socialism, were one and the same materialist evil.*” *Neither Right*, p. 7.

viewed as natural boundaries, or to represent one particular social class. Another of the isms she disdained was internationalism.

Reconstructed notions of the world and the function of individual categories or ideals confirm the perception of nationalism as an exclusive political-social standpoint. The signifying of the nation as the source of political power is manifest in the above-cited testimonies. However, in order to achieve the desired spiritual and political development, all members of the national unit must participate in it.⁵⁹ Calls for unification are evident in Viková-Kunětická's reaction to accusations that her politics were chauvinistic: "*If the word chauvinist is so proscribed in today's campaign against the nation – then let us be chauvinists. Let us be doctors, labourers, clerks, peasants, teachers, traders, army officers, etc., but let us in first place be guardians of the nation, a national bulwark which no enemy can breach by any kind of subterfuge.*"⁶⁰ The nation needs to unite against "*the bloody tempest of foreign Bolshevism [...] which is streaming over the borders into our barely born Czechoslovak state*,"⁶¹ and all classes and elements of the nation were to be mobilised in its defence. Furthermore, materialism most threatened the Czechoslovak working classes, to whom Viková-Kunětická spoke at meetings organised by the Young Generation of the ČsND. At these events she emphasised inter-generational and inter-class co-operation. Other speeches she made at gatherings of the National Democracy, civic associations from the border regions, and the aforementioned proto-fascist organisations were characterised by an endeavour to create a great national front that would stand up in resistance to all enemies.⁶² In this respect she was no different from the remainder of the National Democracy, which had long attempted to win mass support, though without success. Viková-Kunětická's visions also correspond to the principle declared in the programme of the ČsND: "*Our party is the bearer of the programme of the whole nation.*"⁶³

59 The very essence of their own ideology dictates that nationalists must aspire to create a mass political party. I do not believe that this paragraph is anything new, though without a description of Viková-Kunětická's call for national unification it would be incomplete. See note no. 19.

60 LA PNP, f. Božena Viková-Kunětická, box no. 8, *Šovinista*.

61 L. HECZKOVÁ – K. SVATONOVÁ (eds.), *Jus Suffragii*, pp. 267–268.

62 LA PNP, f. Božena Viková-Kunětická, box no. 9, *Projev na schůzi dělnictva a Mladé generace, Projev na schůzi Mladé generace, Projev k studenstvu, Projev na slavnosti předávání praporu*.

63 Josef HARNA (ed.), *Politické programy Československé národní demokracie a Národního sjednocení 1918–1939*, Praha 2017, p. 51. The ČsND turned to integration and unification not only because of its ideology, but also in reaction to the political development of the Czechoslovak Republic. The party was founded through the unification of four political parties, and its chief motivation was to create a monolithic nationalist party. Following its electoral failure in 1920 (when socialist parties predominated), the party began to seek allies for the purpose of improving its electoral results. It went into the 1925 elections alongside the Czechoslovak Peasants' Union, which had broken away from Švehla's Republican Party of Farmers and Peasants, as well as small Ruthenian subjects. The party chose the same strategy in 1929, when the dominant parties were the Slovak National Party

The nationalism of this National Democratic politician was based upon the idea of the nation as a source of power. All elements of the nation were to participate in the exercise of this power. It was therefore populist. The question concerning whether it is possible to add the prefix “ultra”, thereby denoting a departure from liberal democracy, can be answered by means of an analysis of a speech by Viková-Kunětická that preceded the presidential election in 1927. She described the act as a historic moment, which is not sufficient in itself, since she repeated a similar rhetorical figure before every election. However, within the context of the radicalisation of the ČsND and its collaboration with the fascists, this electoral event and the stance taken by Viková-Kunětická towards it was of crucial significance. She spoke against the re-election of T. G. Masaryk, presenting an entirely different worldview and political programme.⁶⁴ She generalised the figure of Masaryk as the face of the development of Czechoslovakia since its independence, to which she had a series of objections. She mobilised her audience by signifying the election as a decisive moment: *“The election is historic, the nation is gaining the right to decide its own destiny. But we know that the spirit of the liberated nation must not be once again held captive and defeated. We also firmly believe that a new life is being born in our country, and that its liberated but abused people shall find a way out of the abyss in which we have found ourselves through no fault of our own.”*⁶⁵ The motif of national decline and the necessity of revival, a key element according to Griffin’s definition, is also present in others of her pre-election speeches. She attempted to delegitimise Masaryk by referring to his first election as unfair, because it should have taken place by popular plebiscite – direct election.⁶⁶ However, Viková-Kunětická did not propose a new political order and did not break away from liberal-democratic institutions and processes. She attacked Masaryk and his collaborators, who in her view were working against the Czech democratic tradition. In terms of her rhetoric, it was therefore not liberalism that was the problem but Masaryk himself. In other parameters too it is impossible to identify any stance taken against the elected parliament or democratic political system. If Viková-Kunětická attacked anyone,

and the Ruthenian Autonomous Agrarian Union. It then took part in the last pre-war elections as the National Unification. The Czechoslovak National Democracy was never able to fulfil its set goals as an independent party.

64 For the sake of interest I present some of the propositions here. In Viková-Kunětická’s view, Masaryk’s humanism was to the detriment of national sentiment, in conflict with idealism and the focus on metaphysical value. She labelled Masaryk a foreign, “non-Czech” figure, and regarded his transfer from Vienna to Charles University as undesirable. He had betrayed the nation with his defence of Hilsner and his contesting of the Dvůr Králové and Zelená Hora Manuscripts. A contribution to her electoral fervour was undoubtedly made by Karel Kramář, who was considering standing for a certain period of time. In the first quoted speech, Viková-Kunětická called for the nation to support him.

65 LA PNP, f. Božena Viková-Kunětická, box no. 9, *Projev o vztahu k Masarykovi*.

66 AKPR, f. T 635/21, box no. 52, *Přednáška B. V. Kunětické na Slovanském ostrově*.

then it was individuals (for example, in addition to the aforementioned cases she also attacked Alfréd Meissner, the author of the electoral regulations establishing the closed electoral lists, who was a member of the Social Democrats and furthermore an ethnic Jew) or collective organisations (typically political parties and civic associations). She took issue with the functioning of the liberal system, not with its foundation. It was not her intention to break with liberal democracy, and her thought cannot therefore be termed ultranationalist; it would be more accurately described as nationalist. According to Viková-Kunětická, liberal democracy was in decline. The passage below focuses on the causes and proposed solutions.

b) The myth of palingenesis and the vision of the future

A central element in the definition of fascism is the aspiration to revive a decaying or stagnant nation.⁶⁷ Fascists declare their indignation at the direction taken by society and propose a new order, which they intend to establish by means of revolution. Viková-Kunětická felt this sense of dissatisfaction and made this clear in her speeches. For her the turning point came in July 1919, when Karel Kramář's government submitted its resignation under the pressure of the municipal election results, to be replaced with the red-green cabinet of Vlastimil Tusar. However, she viewed the departure of the chairman of the National Democracy as a consequence of Kramář's support for military intervention in Russia, which was convulsed by civil war. Seen from her perspective, a conflict was taking place in Russia between the Slavic nation and the materialist Bolsheviks.⁶⁸ In Viková-Kunětická's eyes, Kramář was removed from his post because his opinions were incompatible with Masaryk's.

From that moment on she commented on the situation in Czechoslovakia, for example, as follows: *"The conditions in the Czechoslovak Republic have fundamentally altered to the detriment of our nation, and I cannot conceal the fact that we are making excessive concessions where we should have every right to exercise our veto, since we are ceasing to be an authority in the state we have paid for with our own blood."*⁶⁹ Or: *"The situation in which we have*

67 Critics of the "new consensus" argue that the vision of "resurrection" is nothing new within the realm of political and philosophical currents. Griffin emphasises that the palingenetic myth is intrinsic to fascism only in combination with ultranationalism. The presence and influence of this concept in the action of fascist movements is also confirmed by other scholars, though they reject the idea that it is a key factor for the identification of fascism. O. CINKAJZL, *Ke genezi*, p. 14.

68 LA PNP, f. Božena Viková-Kunětická, box no. 9, *Projev proti uznání Sovětů* and box no. 10, *Projev o politické situaci*. On the subject of Kramář's Slavism see the relevant chapters in M. LUSTIGOVÁ, *Karel Kramář*, pp. 184–208, or in Martina WINKLER, *Karel Kramář (1860–1937): představy o sobě samých, vnímání druhých a modernizace v pojetí českého politika*, Praha 2011, pp. 120–153.

69 Ibidem, box no. 8, *Projev na schůzi delegátek Čsl. demokracie*.

been living since the coup has intensified recently to such an extent that it must necessarily culminate in an economic and political crisis.”⁷⁰ Viková-Kunětická interpreted the fall of Kramář’s government, the higher proportion of socialist parties in the Cabinet,⁷¹ the existence of the Castle Group, and the accommodating approach towards ethnic minorities as a sidelining of national ideals and those who supported them. The consequence of this was societal breakdown: “Today nobody can exist within the nation, not a peasant, a labourer, a tradesman, an industrialist, or a clerk. All the professions are shaken to their very foundations,”⁷² because: “A battle of all against all is raging here, and the winner will be the one who is able to gain the greatest material advantage from it.”⁷³ The triumph of materialism over the spiritual was the reason why as early as in 1920 she spoke of 28 October 1918, the date of the founding of the Czechoslovak Republic, as the final point in the enslavement of the Czechoslovak nation.⁷⁴ The situation in Czechoslovakia had reached a critical point: “We have found ourselves on the slope of a very steep road, which ends in an abyss. This is not meant romantically. Our entire life has been led astray into a predicament from which there will be no way out for entire decades.”⁷⁵ Intrinsic to Viková-Kunětická’s worldview was a dichotomous perspective that caused her to succumb to notions of the power of the moment when she spoke of Czechoslovakia as a boundary between two worlds.⁷⁶ At the moment of decisive struggle (see the presidential election of 1927), she mobilised the nation against the “saboteurs” of nationalism.⁷⁷

70 Ibidem, box no. 8, *Projev o politické situaci*.

71 In comparison with the ČsND, more ministerial posts were held by members of the Social Democrats or National Socialists. Opposition to them was determined by their ideological foundation and their internationalism. Viková-Kunětická (in accordance with the wing of her party) had a relatively positive relationship towards the agrarians, whose ideology and programme she did not regard as foreign or hostile.

72 Ibidem, box no. 9, *Projev na schůzi dělnictva a Mladé generace*.

73 Ibidem, box no. 9, *Projev na sjezdu ČsND žen*.

74 *Národní listy*, 1920, vol. 60, no. 182, p. 1.

75 Ibidem.

76 And don’t you think that the defeated ideal of the national and Slavic idea played a large role in this chaos? “We feel that we are on a boundary between two worlds.” Ibidem.

77 By placing the myth of palingenesis at the centre of his definition, Griffin came close to the concept of political religion. Although in his first work, *The Nature of Fascism*, he took a negative position towards it, in the anthology *Fascism, Totalitarianism and Political Religion* he adopted a more sober stance and entered into a dialogue with one of the chief theorists of the sacralisation of politics, Emilio Gentile. It is precisely with reference to political religion that the Italian historian defines fascism. However, in the case of Viková-Kunětická I incline rather towards the description of her thought as philosophy, since although the nation is at the centre of her reflections, this is not to the extent that it is offered as an answer to all questions in connection with human existence. Nevertheless, the issue and methodology would merit further reflections and criticism. Emilio GENTILE, *Politics as Religion*, 2006; IDEM, *Fascism*, 2005. A classic work is Eric VOEGELIN, *Politická náboženství*, Praha 2015.

In the construction of enemies, Viková-Kunětická employed ethnic and ideological motifs. She identified problematic individuals/groups, attributing to each of them a specific contribution to the national decline. In ethnic terms she defined herself in opposition to the German minority, arguing on the basis of racial difference with references to examples from history. The Czechoslovak state should redress the subjugation of the Czechs under the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, but the citizens of German ethnicity were opposed to this.⁷⁸ She presented the example of the post-war irredentist aspirations in the Sudetenland and conflicts from everyday life. She regarded the regions inhabited by the German minority as stolen, Germanised, and occupied territories which were not an integral component of the state.⁷⁹ From her perspective this represented the battleground in the decisive struggle between Slavs and Germans. The German inhabitants did not contribute directly to the regression of the Czechoslovak nation, but threatened it by their mere presence.⁸⁰ For this reason, in 1924 she established the Border Committee, the role of which was to support Czechoslovak families in border regions. Race, as one of the two key concepts of Viková-Kunětická's ideology, was also determined by her antisemitism, combining rational and irrational elements.⁸¹ She did not believe in the possibility of assimilating the Jewish nation, and rejected the mixing of races.⁸² By alternating the irrational narrative of

78 Although she believed in the project of Czechoslovakism (probably because of the Slavic character of both nations), she was oriented towards the politics of the Czech part of the republic. She therefore spoke primarily of the border conflict between Czechs and Germans. She commented on Hungarian-Slovak relations either entirely separately, or only on rare occasions when she used them as a supplementary argument. E.g.: *Nová síla*, 1926, vol. 6, no. 48, s. 1. LA PNP, f. Božena Viková-Kunětická, box no. 9, *Fragment projevu na Slovensku*.

79 See, for example, *Naše menšiny*, 1924, vol. 4, no. 4, p. 69, *Naše menšiny*, 1925, vol. 5, no. 11–12, pp. 213–215, or her letters reflecting upon life in the Žatec region available in ANM, f. Karel Kramář, inv. no. 766, box no. 18.

80 From the 1920s Viková-Kunětická lived in Libočany, near Žatec, and therefore belonged to the Czechoslovak "border community". This was probably the reason for her interest in the issue in question, which dominated in her politics. A contribution to the establishment of the Border Committee was made by the Women's Provincial Commission, headed by Viková-Kunětická, and the Young Generation of the ČsND, represented by the chairman Jiří Horák. The process of its establishment corresponded to her visions of the unification of the various national elements. LA PNP, Božena Viková-Kunětická, box no. 8, no. 59/55, *Provolání*. See e.g. *Nová síla*, 1926, vol. 6, no. 11, pp. 33–34 and 48, 1926.

81 Divided according to Steven BELLER, *Antisemitism*, Oxford 2015. Beller describes arguments linked with nationalism as rational roots of antisemitism – linguistic difference, differences in symbolic-cultural models. Irrational roots are superstitions associated with Judaism, conspiracy theories, etc.

82 For illustration we may quote her statement on mixed marriages: "*Mixed marriages are a dangerous experiment for every race, because they constitute an onerous entanglement of national, state, and otherwise political problems.*" *Národní listy*, 1922, vol. 62, no. 202, p. 3.

the capitalist Jews and the theory of the Jewish origin of socialism, she came to view the Jewish population as the source of all evil.⁸³

The primary ideological criterion defining the national enemy in Viková-Kunětická's thinking was materialism, which for her covered the political ideologies of socialism, communism, and Bolshevism. She identified all the political parties representing these currents, as well as anyone who collaborated with them, as the culprits of the national decline. It was they who were responsible for the undermining of national sentiment, because they unnaturally divided society into socio-economic classes. They were aided in this by their internationalism, which in Viková-Kunětická's eyes sought to erase the natural borders between nations and races.⁸⁴ For the same reason she also attacked feminism, which she viewed as an assault on traditional national values. Feminists were attempting to tear women away from their "natural" roles as mothers and carers, and were therefore complicit in the decline of the nation.⁸⁵ She also attacked all the above because of their collaboration with ethnic minorities; for her they represented a hostile front that must be battled against in the name of the nation. A similar approach can be seen in her statements in which she blamed the fall of Slavic Russia on the work of a "German-Jewish-Bolshevik clique".⁸⁶ She vilified the Castle Group, represented by Masaryk and Beneš, as guilty of

83 She embraced antisemitism as a component of her nationalism: "*It is said of me that I am a chauvinist and an antisemite. I never draw any conclusions from this, since under the conditions in which we live it is impossible not to be either the former or the latter.*" LA PNP, f. Božena Viková-Kunětická, box no. 8, article *Šovinista*. She spoke openly of oppression by Jewish capital. She exploited the Jewish origin of Alfréd Meissner, the author of the electoral regulations, in her criticism of the closed electoral lists. See LA PNP, f. Božena Viková-Kunětická, box no. 8, article *Organisace lidstva* and *Židovská otázka* or box no. 9., speeches *Přednáška* and *O antisemitismu*.

84 See, for example, LA PNP, f. Božena Viková-Kunětická, box no. 8, articles *Internacionála*, *Resoluce*, or box no. 9, speeches *Projev proti uznání Sovětů*, *projev proti E. Benešovi*.

85 Viková-Kunětická spoke out against feminism from the very beginning of her political career. She did not regard her election in 1912 as a triumph of the women's movement, but rather as a success of Czech nationalism. See LA PNP, f. Božena Viková-Kunětická, box no. 9, *Fragment projevu na Slovensku*. Vlasta Borovičková wrote the following about her conception of feminism in 1919: "*As a female member of parliament she did not serve women, but the nation. For politics she was a poor feminist, i.e. not a feminist at all. This woman best holds within herself the treasure of the national spirit, she is a vestal of its fire.*" Quoted according to Jan VOBORNÍK, *Božena Viková-Kunětická*, Praha 1934, p. 34.

86 An illustrative example can be provided by the following statements: "[...] *not even Russia, now that the reins of government in the Kremlin have been seized by the Jewish agents Lenin and Trotsky-Bronstein, with the assistance of German and Russian diplomacy.*" (p. 273) "*Today the Jews stand on the boundary of a dual truth and on the boundary of a dual morality. With one [morality – author's note] they drive the masses of the Slavic people in pursuit of the chimera offered by international socialist propaganda, and with the other they harbour within their innards a terrible lust for power. Throughout the entire duration of the war, their Austrophile and Germanophile press, their Bolshevik persuasion since the war, their hatred of all things Czech and Slovak, which was, is, and shall be – all of this today stands before the Czech intelligentsia as a warning and as a milestone*" (p. 280–281). "*The nation detests Bronstein, Apfelbaum, Zederblum, and the sound of all of those true Jewish names hiding beneath their Russian*

collaboration with socialists, communists, Bolsheviks, and feminists, and for neglecting national traditions. Enemies from within and without had caused the disintegration of the Czechoslovak nation and state; the only salvation could be a national revival. But what kind of vision did Viková-Kunětická have of the future? What ought to change, and how?

The only possible remedy would be a return to national and racial ideals, thus a discarding of materialism and its political representatives, since the decline was framed by the actions of politicians associated either with the left or with Masaryk's humanism. The mobilisation of nationally conscious individuals headed by Karel Kramář and the ČsND was to lead the nation in its one true direction – nationalism. Viková-Kunětická linked this new direction of Czechoslovakia to the fall of the Soviet Union and the restoration of Slavic Russia.⁸⁷ She employed the biblical motif of resurrection, and not only within the national context: *"This is not life, this is bare existence. This is not freedom... We call for a national resurrection! Today this concerns the honour of the nation,"*⁸⁸ but also within the racial one: *"Incidentally, I firmly believe that I shall live to see the day when a resurrected Russia, though she may bear wounds all over her body, shall rise up in a new, vital strength [...]"*⁸⁹ In accordance with her declaration concerning the need for a Slavic fascism that was capable of both defence and development, she oscillated between the national and racial levels of the palingenetic myth. She insisted upon the historical necessity of revival, because (Russia shall rise) *"in order to become the protector of the Slavic nations, and above all the protector of the westernmost branches of the Slavic state of Czechoslovakia, in order to fulfil its mission in a national and Slavic spirit."*⁹⁰ She described the participation of the Czechoslovak nation in a common Slavic future in similar terms: *"We will not seek models for our political independence anywhere else, but only within ourselves, only in our*

pseudonyms. It detests them because they have uprooted Russia from its foundations [...]" (p. 304) *"If the self-assurance of our nation and the other formerly oppressed Slavic tribes is ever to be resurrected, it shall be resurrected through the liberation of Russia from the agonies of German-Jewish tyranny [...]"* (p. 310). L. HEZCKOVÁ – K. SVATOŇOVÁ (eds.), *Jus Suffragii*, 2012.

87 The order in which these processes were to take place is not clear from the sources. Sometimes she spoke of the need to invade the USSR, at other times she intimated that change would come from there: *"We all know that from there and nowhere else shall come the freedom of our hearts and souls. Without doubt, the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes also know it. If the self-assurance of our nation and the other formerly oppressed Slavic tribes is ever to be resurrected, it shall be resurrected through the liberation of Russia from the agonies of German-Jewish tyranny, and if the Slavic racial idea that shall become the foundation of the new culture and the new understanding of man is to triumph, it shall surely triumph upon the terrible burial ground of the millions of women, children, and families who have become the victims of the bloodthirsty predators that need great sacrifices of blood to dictate the order of their world domination."* Ibidem, p. 188.

88 LA PNP, f. Božena Viková-Kunětická, box no. 9, *Projev na schůzi dělnictva a Mladé generace*.

89 Ibidem, *Projev na sjezdu ČsND*.

90 Ibidem, box no. 8, *Projev o politické situaci*.

own history, and only in the meaning that we have for Slavism as the westernmost part of the Slavic lands, which shall never move from its place, since it is responsible not only for its own future but also for the future of all Slavs, whom it protects with its very body."⁹¹

Viková-Kunětická's rhetoric and journalism contain a sense of frustration at social decay, a concretisation of its causes, and visions of a new national and racial order. However, her vision of the future is conspicuously vague and is focused in a single direction: the restoration of Slavic Russia, a transformation of the political relations in Czechoslovakia, and closer co-operation (or perhaps integration?) of the Slavic nations. The transformation, at least within Czechoslovakia, was to be led by agitational and intellectual means. The national movement was to be headed by Karel Kramář, a figure uncritically admired by Viková-Kunětická; in this it is possible to identify an inspiration by fascist practice. Nevertheless, her ideal stands and falls with the utopian dream of the awakening of all the people and the blind following of nationalist ideas. But she does not mention violence in the pursuit of this dream even once. The element of a populist revolution from below, which is crucial for fascist ideology, is also lacking. The motif of the continual progress and improvement of the nation contained in her statement: "*Our struggle did not commence with the war and it did not end with freedom. Our struggle has been, is and shall be!*"⁹² is unique, and follows on logically from the sense of an incomplete building of the nation-state. In other words, if we were to apply a definition of fascism to the analysis conducted here and to work with it as a list of criteria, then Viková-Kunětická's ideological map lacks not only the element of ultranationalism but also the revolutionary character of the changes she demands.

Conclusion

Božena Viková-Kunětická, like many other members of the Czechoslovak National Democracy, repeatedly entered into interactions with the proto-fascist and fascist organisations that emerged in Czechoslovakia after 1921. She expressed verbal support for them and also took part in events organised by them. She spoke similarly positively about Italian fascism, and in 1926 at the latest spoke in favour of its national permutation. Viková-Kunětická and the representatives of Czech fascism shared an ideological concordance, for example in the area of geopolitics (Slavic unity and future) and in their rhetorical strategies, operating with the terms materialism and idealism, which they employed in the same manner.⁹³

91 Ibidem, box. no. 9, *Projev na sjezdu ČsND žen*.

92 Ibidem.

93 The idea of Slavic unity resonated in the ranks of the NOF thanks to the symbolic-mythological complex of Czech national identity. Since the 19th century, the image of Czech-German rivalry, or the motif of the

In order to answer the second research question, I have applied the model of generic fascism inspired by Griffin, and the conclusions of the analysis can be summarised as follows: Viková-Kunětická's political thought contains elements identical with fascist ideology. Their difference consists in the absence of revolutionary ultranationalism, since the author did not abandon the ideal of democratic nationalism.⁹⁴ Although she criticised the development of the Czechoslovak Republic and her rhetoric contains references to decadence and social decline, she never embarked on a path of revolution with the goal of a radical change of the political system of Czechoslovakia.⁹⁵ Her condemnations were directed in particular at the representatives of the developments that followed the establishment of the independent Czechoslovak Republic. In the second half of the 1920s her thought appears radical, though in essence it remained conservative-nationalist. A continuity can be traced in her opinions, evident in the fact that she commented on the national regression even before 1921, when the first proto-fascist group, the National Movement, appeared. Fascism did not shape her thinking, but it intensified it. The collaboration between the ČsND and the NOF in 1926 and 1927 was of determining significance in increasing her activity as a National Democratic politician, and their subsequent split was then one of the factors leading to her withdrawal from public life (she no longer stood as a candidate in 1929) and a dwindling of her intra-party activity.

A question arises as to why Viková-Kunětická, considered by historians and by the author of this study as a radical, did not join the fascist spectrum and embark upon a revolutionary path. In my view, her conception of the nation differs from the fascist model in a small but nonetheless fundamental detail. Nationalism, as the political representative of the national ideal, was not a revolutionary force for her, but was based upon tradition.⁹⁶ In

Germanic-Slavic conflict, had played a dominant role. The reference to the Slavs as a larger (and thus stronger) group capable of countering Germanic expansion was continuously transmitted and used in Czech fascism, which necessarily had to build on the pre-war tradition. I believe that the same factors were at work in the case of Viková-Kunětická. See *O ideologii českoslov. politických stran XI. Ideologie čl. fašismu*, Praha 1931; J. DRÁBIK, *Fašizmus*, 2019, pp. 427–431.

94 For a comparison of ultranationalism with the reconstructed thought of Viková-Kunětická we may present the opening sentences of the programme of the NOF from 1935: "*The state apparatus must not serve individuals at the helm of government, but must serve the whole, i.e. the nation. This can be achieved only by a complete change of political regime and a change of the state constitution, which shall stipulate as its condition: a corporate state [...]*" For another example of revolutionary ultranationalism see J. DRÁBIK, *Fašizmus*, 2019.

95 References to the decay and breakdown of society were nothing exceptional in the First Czechoslovak Republic. For example, as early as in 1919 the Republican League for the Moral Regeneration of the Nation was established, which: "[...] *strives for its goal – the moral regeneration and continual moral elevation of the Czechoslovak nation [...]*" *Základní řád Republikánské Ligy pro mravní obrodu národa*, 1919, p. 1.

96 Selected statements on the national tradition: "*For the standing of our nation and state does not consist in any kind of diplomatic art, or even in mere amateurism, but consists in its self-assurance, its character*

her conception the nation had a perennial essence – it had determined the development of humanity since time immemorial. By contrast, the fascists exploited the nation as a source of power, upon the foundation of which they sought to destroy the linear development that was leading to decline and to establish a new order. Viková-Kunětická also spoke of regression and identified the same culprits, but she wished to return the nation to its tradition, which in the case of the Czechoslovak nation was democratic.⁹⁷ Both schools of thought therefore aspire to change, but in its concretisation and the manner of implementation they draw upon different sources. In other words, applying the terminology of Michael Freeden, it is possible to assert that Viková-Kunětická's political map differs from that of fascism in the position occupied by the key concept and the other ideals with which it is associated. The fact that she did not cross the line into revolutionary transformation may thus be determined by her conservatism and her unwillingness to replace the national myth and the conception of the nation with its fascist counterpart. At the same time, it is necessary to take into consideration her loyalty to Karel Kramář, whom she addressed and referred to as her leader. Had the ČSND and the NOF merged together, it is difficult to imagine that she would have supported Radola Gajda as the sole national leader.

Viková-Kunětická was therefore one of many National Democratic politicians who inclined towards inter-war fascism. The causes of her sympathies were determined by both reason and necessity. The cognitive factors ensue from the preceding analysis. I use the term “necessity” to refer to her practical politics. She identified the decisive moment of the national decay as the fall of the national coalition of Karel Kramář. At the same time, this moment foreshadowed the decline of the entire Czechoslovak National Democracy, viewed from Viková-Kunětická's perspective as the sole entity defending national interests. The party's declining electoral support and the growing influence of socialist and ethnic minority parties led her and indeed the whole party to seek a strong ally. Thanks to their ideological intersection, the new fascist groups appeared to be ideal for this purpose. Her

and in its national and racial tradition.” (p. 300), “*Thus, it appears to me that the concept of the nation is in fact no more than a political expression of the tribes of a certain race and a document of their developmental, cultural, and existential readiness, but that this concept lacks sufficient sovereignty if it is not backed up by the tradition and capacity of race as the wellspring of the continual and ever-ongoing renewal of national forces and their rights to life.*” (p. 277). L. HECZKOVÁ – K. SVATOŇOVÁ (eds.), *Jus Suffragii*, 2012.

97 “[...] *in brief, all that constitutes our nation, which has renounced its historical claim to its kingdom, and is now renouncing capitalism in its beautiful tradition of honest democratism.*” (p. 269) “[...] *but after four years of war we have sobered up even from these dreams, precisely because for 300 years we grew alongside the Habsburg dynasty into a powerful, self-confident democratic nation, which has in fact long settled its accounts with kings.*” (p. 272) “*I consider this return of the broad masses of the people under the banner of Czechoslovak unification to be the greatest triumph of the democratic tradition of the Czech nation.*” (p. 275). *Ibidem*.

inclination was therefore determined by the aspiration to create a strong, pro-national political representation. A second motivation was the unfinished building of the nation-state. For Viková-Kunětická, the winning of the nation-state had not been completed in 1918, as documented by her statements referring to the stolen border regions and her activities in defence of the Czech minority who lived there. She criticised the insufficient nationalisation of the state; for her the process of the pre-war nationalist movement had not been brought to its conclusion with the establishment of the Czechoslovak Republic. In the campaign against those who disagreed with her perspective (Masaryk, Beneš, and others), she logically allied herself with subjects who were ideologically close to her.

Božena Viková-Kunětická was a remarkable figure on the right of the inter-war political spectrum. Because of her interests and ideals she collaborated with representatives of Czech fascism, with whom she shared a similar worldview and interpretation of history. This case study, focusing on the intertwining of conservative nationalism and fascist politics, may serve as a basis for further research identifying other political formations and figures and their thought.

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