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The Illusion of Power or Relentless Reality? Ceremonial and Ritual Practices at the Court of Moscow in the Middle of the 17th Century through the Eyes of the Imperial Diplomats

Abstract: The main aim of the contribution is to show upon the background of the diplomatic missions of the Habsburg diplomats – Allegretto Alleghetti and Johann Theodor of Lorbach (1655–1656), Johann Christoph of Fragstein and Christoph Beuer of Binnen (1657–1658) – how the ceremonial and ritual practices at the Tsar’s court were perceived by these mentioned diplomats. Furthermore, how there were reflected particular means of visualisation of the political status of the Habsburg representatives on the one hand and of the Russian head of state and his councillors and advisers on the other hand. These mutual encounters of at the first sight completely different worlds of thoughts and value systems could not avoid cultural clashes and misunderstandings (the arguments about the usage of right titles, about rules of precedence, the Tsar’s inappropriate gestures during official meetings, the Russians, imposing of their arrogant behaviour on the Habsburg diplomats).

Keywords: Habsburg diplomats – court of Moscow – 17th century – ceremonial and ritual practices – performance of power

The series of peace treaties in Münster and Osnabrück at the end of 1640s constituted a significant turning-point in the development of modern diplomacy and international relations.¹ Despite of reaching agreements between particular antagonized parties, the political situation in Europe was exceedingly complicated. There henceforward endured bitter power rivalry between France and Habsburg Monarchy

1 Comp. Zdeněk VESELÝ, *Dějiny diplomacie*, Praha 2008, p. 83. On the Westphalian peace treaties Lucien BÉLY (ed.), *L'Europe des traités de Westphalie. Esprit de la diplomatie et diplomatie de l'esprit*, Paris 2000; Guido BRAUN – Christoph KAMPMANN – Maximilian LANZINNER – Michael ROHRSCHEIDER (eds.), *L'art de la paix. Kongresswesen und Friedensstiftung im Zeitalter des Westfälischen Friedens*, Münster 2011. The presented paper is published within the project of the Grant Agency of the Faculty of Philosophy of the University of South Bohemia in České Budějovice, grant titled: *Diplomatická mise Jana Kryštofa z Fragsteinu do Moskvy v letech 1657–1658 ve světle pramenů (kritická edice)*.

which significantly influenced political circumstances and affairs in other European countries.² Also the relationships of Danubian Monarchy towards Tsardom of Russia (Grand Duchy of Moscow)³ were in this period dependable on current international situation.⁴ It can be said to simplify that a majority of embassies sent by Habsburg emperors to Moscow in this time were concerning extraordinarily escalated Polish-Russian relations.⁵ The descendants of Rudolf I of Habsburg belonged to traditional allies of the Rzeczpospolita and endeavoured actively to mediate peace between the both antagonized powers.⁶

This topic is also being paid attention to in the following study. It strives to outline problems which imperial diplomats Allegretto Allegretti and Johann Dietrich of Lorbach in years 1655–1656 and Johann Christoph of Fragstein together with Christoph Beuer of Binnen in years 1657–1658⁷ had to face during their diplomatic missions to Moscow,

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- 2 Martin WREDE, *Das Reich und seine Feinde. Politische Feindbilder in der Reichspatriotischen Publizistik zwischen Westfälischen Frieden und Siebenjährigem Krieg*, Mainz 2004. For example in Rzeczpospolita it is possible to note a sort of variation in power shifts of the Polish kings to either France or Habsburg Central-European monarchy. Zbigniew WÓJCIK (ed.), *Historia dyplomacji polskiej II, 1572–1795*, Warszawa 1982, p. 184.
 - 3 Leading European powers considered the Russian sovereign as a “Grand Duke of Moscow” until the year 1721 in which Peter I the Great was officially proclaimed the “Tsar of all Russia”. Jan HENNINGS, *The Semiotics of Diplomatic Dialogue: Pomp and Circumstance in Tsar Peter I’s Visit to Vienna in 1698*, *The International History Review* 30, 2008, pp. 515–544, here p. 519.
 - 4 Alfred Francis PRIBRAM, *Österreichische Vermittlungs-Politik im polnisch-russischen Kriege 1654–1660*, *Archiv für österreichische Geschichte* 75, 1889, pp. 415–480; Iskra SCHWARCZ – Christoph AUGUSTYNOWICZ, *Отношения Габсбургов с Россией и Украиной в период международного кризиса середины XVII в.*, in: Iskra Schwarcz – Olga Chavanova – Boris Florja – Michael Meyer – Lidija Semenova (eds.), *Русская и украинская дипломатия в международных отношениях в Европе в середине XVII в.*, Moscow 2007, pp. 233–310.
 - 5 Hartmut RÜSS, *Die Friedensverhandlungen zwischen Moskau und Polen-Litauen im Jahre 1537. Eine Studie zur moskowitzischen Diplomatiegeschichte*, *Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas* 36, 1988, pp. 191–217; Bogusław DYBAŚ, *Wojny północne w XVI–XVIII wieku*, Toruń 2007. Comp. Bickford C. O’BRIEN, *Muscovy and the Ukraine. From the Pereiaslavl Agreement to the Truce of Andrusovo, 1654–1667*, Berkeley 1963.
 - 6 Walter LEITSCH, *Die ersten 300 Jahre in den Beziehungen Russlands zu Österreich*, *Mitteilungen des Österreichischen Staatsarchivs* 50, 2000, pp. 65–77, here p. 70. To Polish-Austrian relations more Walter LEITSCH – Stanisław TRAWKOWSKI (eds.), *Polen und Österreich im 16. Jahrhundert*, Wien 1997; Walter LEITSCH – Stanisław TRAWKOWSKI (eds.), *Polen und Österreich im 17. Jahrhundert*, Wien – Köln – Weimar 1999; Walter LEITSCH – Stanisław TRAWKOWSKI (eds.), *Polen und Österreich im 18. Jahrhundert*, Warszawa 2000.
 - 7 Friedrich von ADELUNG, *Kritisch-literarische Übersicht der Reisenden in Russland bis 1700, deren Berichte bekannt sind II*, St. Petersburg 1846, pp. 327, 328–329; Nikolaj Nikolajewič BANTYŃ-KAMENSKIJ (ed.), *Обзор внешних сношений России (по 1800 год) I (Австрия, Англия, Венгрия, Голландия, Дания, Испания)*, Moscow 1894, pp. 21–22; Veniamin Olexandrovič KORDT (ed.), *Чужоземні подорожі по Східній Європі до 1700 р.*, Kyjiv 1926, pp. 124–125; Marshall POE, *Foreign Descriptions of Muscovy: An Analytic Bibliography of Primary and Secondary Sources*, s. I. 2008², pp. 129, 130 (first edition Columbus 1995).

following long-term stay and also their everyday life there.⁸ A characteristic feature of the mutual meetings of these two at first sight different intellectual and value worlds was constituted by frequent misunderstandings and thereupon rising conflicts. The detailed commentaries of various conflict situations (for example concerning proper titling of both the emperor and tsar, ceremonial succession, inappropriate gestures of the tsar during audiences and alleged disdainful behaviour of the Russian side towards imperial diplomats), the argumentation of imperial and Russian sides as well as the outfalls of particular quarrels significantly influenced the views of Habsburg diplomats reflecting researched topics.⁹

Mid-Eastern Europe in the first half of the 17th century

The countries of Mid-Eastern Europe did not particularly take part in the Thirty Years' War. Nevertheless, there were breaking out numerous armed clashes which were crucially reflected in mutual contacts of both the above mentioned powers. Apart from the tsar Russia, these campaigns were alternately entered also by the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, Brandenburg, Sweden, the Ottoman Empire and the Crimean Khanate.¹⁰ Independently of the biggest war conflict of the 17th century there was waged so-called Smolensk War (1632–1634) between Poland and Russia. This followed a period of struggles for the tsar throne after the extinction of the Rurik dynasty in 1598 (Smuta – “Time of Troubles”) which also the Polish king joined in.¹¹ The Smolensk War broke out after the death of Polish king Sigismund III Vasa (1566–1632) when by contrast the Muscovites,

8 Comp. Georg von RAUCH, *Moskau und der Westen im Spiegel der schwedischen diplomatischen Berichte der Jahre 1651–1655*, Archiv für Kulturgeschichte 34, 1952, pp. 22–66; Libor SVOBODA, *Diplomatické vztahy mezi Habsburky a Ruskem v letech 1654–1656*, Brno 2006 (Dissertation thesis); Iskra SCHWARCZ, *Die kaiserlichen Gesandten und das diplomatische Zeremoniell am Moskauer Hof in der zweiten Hälfte des 17. Jahrhunderts*, in: Ralph Kauz – Giorgio Rota – Jan Paul Niederkorn (eds.), *Diplomatisches Zeremoniell in Europa und im Mittleren Osten in der frühen Neuzeit*, Wien 2009, pp. 265–286.

9 Comp. Christian WINDLER, *Symbolische Kommunikation und diplomatische Praxis in der Frühen Neuzeit. Erträge neuer Forschungen*, in: Barbara Stollberg-Rilinger – Tim Neu – Christina Brauner (eds.), *Alles nur symbolisch? Bilanz und Perspektiven der Erforschung symbolischer Kommunikation*, Köln – Weimar – Wien 2013, pp. 161–185.

10 Józef Andrzej GIEROWSKI, *Rzeczpospolita w dobie złotej wolności (1648–1763)*, Kraków 2004, p. 10.

11 Walter LEITSCH, *Moskau und die Politik des Kaiserhofes im XVII. Jahrhundert I. Teil 1604–1654*, Graz – Köln 1960, pp. 21–63; Milan ŠVANKMAJER – Václav VEBER – Zdeněk SLÁDEK – Vladislav MOULIS, *Dějiny Ruska*, Praha 1995, pp. 49–57; Mariusz MARKIEWICZ, *Historia Polski, 1492–1795*, Kraków 2007, pp. 450–459. Directly to the question of Smuta (“Time of Troubles”) see: Chester S. L. DUNNING, *Russia's First Civil War: the Time of Troubles and the Founding of the Romanov Dynasty*, Pennsylvania 2001; Andrzej ANDRUSIEWICZ, *Dymitr Samozwaniec i Maryna Mniszech*, Warszawa 2009.

who had been ruled by the Romanov dynasty since 1613, strived to take advantage of disturbances during Polish interregnum. Tsar forces vainly tried to conquer Smolensk which performed a strategic fort and symbolic key to the river gate – a corridor towards West between the rivers Dvina and Dnieper.¹² Finally, for Russia there happened to be more important the peace talks in Polanowo in 1634 than the war operations themselves. In this peace treaty concluded “for all time” Władysław IV Vasa (1595–1648) resigned on the title of Moscow tsar which had been claimed by the Polish kings since the end of Polish-Russian war in years 1609–1618.¹³ He among others also accepted the validity of the election of Moscow tsar Michael I Fedorovich Romanov (1596–1645) in 1613 and awarded him the titles of Grand Duke and Tsar.¹⁴ After the accession of Aleksey I Mikhailovich (1629–1676) to the Russian throne in 1645, the Polish-Russian relations even improved and both countries cooperated in facing the Tartars.¹⁵

After the death of Sigismund III Vasa there also came a split between the Rzeczpospolita and the Ottoman Empire. The Turkish side was worried about possible accession of the Habsburgs or the Romanovs to the Polish throne. Other reasons were provided by Polish subjects, Zaporozhian Cossacks, whose settlements had been allegedly built on Ottoman territories. They were in addition lunging toward Turkish borderland. However, this clash was also warded off at the end of the 17th century.¹⁶ A far more serious problem was represented by the efforts of Władysław IV Vasa, the successor of Sigismund to the Polish throne, to realize a new pan-Christian military campaign against the Turks which should have been undertaken in 1640s. Its aim was to recover the “tarnished glory of Christian chivalry” and reunite the Catholic and Protestant Christians against their mutual enemy.¹⁷ But the effort of the monarch to raise a strong Cossack army against the Turks contributed to an internal disaster of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth which consequently gained international significance.¹⁸

12 Konstantin Vasiljevič PETROV, *Новые источники по истории Смоленской войны 1632–1634 гг.*, Очерки феодальной России 4, 2000, pp. 116–132; Dariusz KUPISZ, *Smoleńsk 1632–1634*, Warszawa 2001.

13 Leszek PODHORODECKI, *Wazowie w Polsce*, Warszawa 1985, pp. 242–243; Mariusz MARKIEWICZ, *Historia Polski 1492–1795*, Kraków 2007, pp. 479–480.

14 Z. WÓJCIK (ed.), *Historia dyplomacji polskiej II*, p. 117. It is interesting that Polish diplomat Mikulas Woronicz, who addressed Michael I Fedorovich in this way, should have been subsequently put on trial by the Polish Sejm. *Ibidem*, p. 96.

15 *Ibidem*, pp. 101–102.

16 Z. WÓJCIK (ed.), *Historia dyplomacji polskiej II*, pp. 108–109; Władysław A. SERCZYK, *Na dalekiej Ukrainie. Dzieje Kozaczyzny do 1648 roku*, Kraków – Wrocław 1984, pp. 340–345; S. GRZYBOWSKI, *Dzieje Polski i Litwy*, p. 377; Władysław A. SERCZYK, *Na płonącej Ukrainie. Dzieje Kozaczyzny 1648–1651*, Kraków 2009, p. 11–15.

17 Z. WÓJCIK (ed.), *Historia dyplomacji polskiej II*, pp. 107–111.

18 W. A. SERCZYK, *Na dalekiej Ukrainie*, pp. 142–167.

For there broke out the uprising of the Cossacks led by Bohdan Khmelnytsky in the Ukraine in 1648.¹⁹ Although it was an internal matter of the Rzeczpospolita, one of its main features was the immediate internationalization. Since its beginning, Khmelnytsky promptly negotiated about a coalition with the neighbouring countries. He nearly immediately succeeded in persuading the Tartars to ally and addressed Transylvanian and also Hungarian aristocracy. Nevertheless, the most powerful neighbour – Russia – refused Khmelnytsky as a rioter and rebel.²⁰ In year 1654 the Muscovites consented to bargain with the Cossacks and there was concluded the Treaty of Pereyaslav by means of which the Zaporozhian Cossacks entered the liege bound to Russia.²¹ This agreement resulted in another Polish-Russian war for the Left-bank Ukraine that lasted with certain interludes until the year 1667.²² The so-far complicated international situation, in which the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth involved in several conflicts with its neighbours, was further perplexed by relations to ancestral homeland of the Polish Vasa dynasty members – to Sweden. During years 1600–1629 there repeatedly arose wars between the both countries concerning the rights of succession to the Swedish throne.²³ In 1629 there was called the six-year Truce of Altmark which was then prolonged in Sztumska Wieś for the following 26 years (until the year 1661). The situation changed in 1654 when the Swedish queen Christina resigned and the throne was acceded by Charles X Gustav

19 J. A. GIEROWSKI, *Rzeczpospolita*, pp. 20–23. Comp. W. A. SERCZYK, *Na płonącej Ukrainie*.

20 Josef MACŮREK, *Význam a ohlas opětovného sjednocení Ukrajiny s Ruskem z roku 1654 v dějinách slovanských a evropských*, in: *Věčná družba*, Praha 1955, pp. 75–114; Vladimír HOSTIČKA, *Bohdan Chmelnyckyj a jeho zahraniční politika (1646–1657)*, *Slovanský přehled* 52, 1966, pp. 354–361; Libor SVOBODA, *Vztahy Bohdana Chmelnického a Moskvy v letech 1648–1649*, *Sborník prací filozofické fakulty brněnské univerzity C* 48, 2001, pp. 119–143.

21 B. C. O'BRIEN, *Muscovy and the Ukraine*.

22 Z. WÓJCIK (ed.), *Historia dyplomacji polskiej* II, p. 170; IDEM, *Traktat andruszowski 1667 roku i jego geneza*, Warszawa 1959; M. MARKIEWICZ, *Historia Polski*, p. 517.

23 Since 1587 Rzeczpospolita was ruled by the Vasa dynasty, originally of Swedish kings. The Polish king Sigismund III Vasa (1566–1632) was a son of John III Vasa (1537–1592) and his first wife Catherine Jagiellon (1526–1583). As the first-born son he had at the same time the pretension to the Crown of Sweden. In the female line he also became a relative to the extinct female line of Polish-Lithuanian Jagiellonians. Thanks to his kinship to the Jagiellonians, the Polish noblemen elected him a new king which fact he accepted. This, however, resulted in losing his Swedish Crown that was seized by his uncle Charles IX Vasa (1550–1611). Since this time until his death in 1632, Sigismund III Vasa had been vainly trying to gain the crown back. Such task was then adopted by his sons – Władysław IV (1595–1648) and John II Casimir (1609–1672) who changed themselves on the Polish throne. Meanwhile, Sweden, which could not have been included among the great powers of the 16th century, became during the reigns of Charles IX Vasa and Gustav II Adolph (1594–1632) one of the most powerful European countries. After their own military successes in the Thirty Years' War, the Swedish kings started aspiring to the Polish throne. The efforts of the Polish Vasa dynasty members therefore turned against themselves. Comp. Stanisław GRZYBOWSKI, *Dzieje Polski i Litwy 1506–1648*, Kraków 2000.

(1622–1660).²⁴ During the following year he invaded with his armies Poland, because of persisting dynastic quarrels and his efforts to constitute the “imperium maris Baltici”, and he soon occupied nearly all the country.²⁵ The Polish king John II Casimir had to flee to the Habsburg territories in Silesia whereby he forced Ferdinand III of Habsburg to take a clear viewpoint concerning the occurred matter.²⁶

The year 1654 became a turning point of the international situation in Mid-Eastern Europe. In June Charles X Gustav superseded the queen Christina on the Swedish throne, in January there was concluded the Treaty of Pereyaslav between the Zaporozhian Cossacks and Russia that led to the Polish-Russian war and also to the change of political orientation of the Tartars who joined the Rzeczpospolita. In the same year there were also resumed diplomatic relations between the Habsburgs and Russia after nearly a forty-year silence.²⁷ Aleksey I Mikhailovich, who negotiated with the rioting Cossacks even before the Treaty of Pereyaslav was concluded, decided to use his diplomats in order to find out the attitudes of particular powers towards the forthcoming war against the Rzeczpospolita and spy out their possible counter actions. By the end of 1653 he therefore gradually sent his delegates to Sweden, France, Denmark and the Netherlands and during the following year also to Constantinople, Moldavia, Wallachia, Brandenburg, Courland, Vienna and Crimea.²⁸

24 Peter ENGLUND, *Nepřemožitelný. Historie první severní války*, Praha 2004, pp. 118–119; Lis GRANLUND, *Queen Hedwig Eleonora of Sweden: Dowager, Builder, and Collector*, in: Clarissa Campbell Orr (ed.), *Queenship in Europe 1660–1815: The Role of the Consort*, Cambridge 2004, pp. 56–76, here p. 57.

25 P. ENGLUND, *Nepřemožitelný*, pp. 163–204.

26 Tadeusz WASILEWSKI, *Droga króla Jana Kazimierza na Śląsk 25 IX – 20 X 1655 r.*, in: Andrzej Bartnicki – Jan Dzięgielewski – Ireneusz Ihnatowicz – Jerzy Maternicki – Józef Szaflik – Maria Wawrykowa (eds.), *Kultura, Polityka, Dyplomacja*, Warszawa 1990, pp. 451–466.

27 The last diplomatic contacts between the both powers were approached before the beginning of the Thirty Years' War during years 1616–1617. At that time tsar Michael I Fedorovich sent a deputation lead by Lukijan Ivanovich Mjasnov to Vienna. Boris Nikolajevič FLORJA, *Россия и чешское восстание против Габсбургов*, Moscow 1986, pp. 20–32; L. SVOBODA, *Diplomatické vzťahy*, pp. 56–58; Antonia von REICHE, *Der Weg des russischen Zarentums zur Anerkennung in der Zeit von 1547 bis 1722 (Eine völkerrechtlich-historische Studie)*, Hamburg 2001 (Dissertation thesis), pp. 89–90.

28 Georg von RAUCH, *Moskau und die europäischen Mächte des 17. Jahrhunderts*, *Historische Zeitschrift* 178, 1954, pp. 22–66; Lev Valentinovič ZABOROVSKIJ, *Начало русско-польской войны и дипломатические контакты России с Австрией, Бранденбургом и другими европейскими державами (конец 1653–январь 1655 г.)*, in: Исследования по славяно-германским отношениям, Москва 1971, pp. 301–321; Libor SVOBODA, *Vztah mezi Habsburky a Ruskem v druhé polovině 17. století. Poselstvo Baklanovského a Michajlova do Vídně roku 1654*, *Sborník prací Filozofické fakulty brněnské univerzity C* 51, 2004, pp. 55–88, here pp. 62–69; IDEM, *Diplomatické vzťahy*, pp. 46–53; Boris Nikolajevič FLORJA, *Русское государство и его западные соседи (1655–1661 гг.)*, Москва 2010.

Vienna and Moscow in the mid-17th century

The Russian delegation arrived to Vienna in October 1654. It was led by okolnichy Ivan Ivanovich Baklanovskij and dyak Ivan Mikhailov.²⁹ There were 23 persons involved and its official mission was to deliver Ferdinand III of Habsburg a message about the death of Michael I Fedorovich Romanov (died on 23rd July 1645), the accession of his son Aleksey I Mikhailovich to the tsar throne and request for maintaining “good friendly relations” between the new Russian monarch and the descendants of Rudolf I of Habsburg.³⁰ According to the Tsar’s instruction, the delegates should have tried to obtain information about the attitude of Ferdinand III of Habsburg towards the currently running Russian-Polish war. There was simultaneously needed to find out if the Habsburg monarch would send his forces to help the Polish king or possibly let John II Casimir Vasa to recruit soldiers in the Holy Roman Empire territories.³¹ As a pretext to declare the war, the delegates quoted faulty titling of the tsar which the descendant of Sigismund III Vasa used during their contacts, his alliance with the Tartars, armed raids on his subjects and further series of slights and violations.³² In the same time a roving ambassador of the Rzeczpospolita – Alexander Dönhoff – was heading to Vienna to convey a condolence concerning the death of Ferdinand IV of Habsburg (1633–1654). He was also instructed to inform the imperial court about the ongoing Polish-Tartar negotiations and ask for military support in the war with Russia.³³

The Danubian Monarchy was not willing to involve in any war conflict after the Thirty Years’ War. Therefore Ferdinand III of Habsburg decided to follow the course of

29 Ludwig BITTNER – Lothar GROSS, *Repertorium der diplomatischen Vertreter aller Länder seit dem Westfälischen Frieden I (1648–1715)*, Berlin 1936, p. 434; L. SVOBODA, *Vztah mezi Habsburky a Ruskem*; Iskra SCHWARCZ, *Отношения Габсбургов с Россией и Украиной в период международного кризиса середины XVII в.*, in: *Русская и украинская дипломатия в международных отношениях в Европе середины XVII в.*, Moscow 2007, pp. 231–310, here p. 233.

30 An official announcement of the enthronization of a new sovereign belonged to the most frequent reasons of sending diplomatic delegations in Early Modern period. However, in this case it came nine years after the death of Michael I Fedorovich Romanov, which was of course not so common. *Памятники дипломатических сношений древней России с державами иностранными III (с 1632 по 1660 год)*, St. Petersburg 1854, pp. 91–248; L. SVOBODA, *Diplomatické vzťahy*, pp. 63–65; Anastasija Vladimirovna MERZANOVA, *Возобновление дипломатических отношений России и Священной Римской империи германской нации в 1654 г. Посольство И. И. Баклановского и И. Михайлова*, *Вестник Московского государственного областного университета. Серия: История и политические науки* 2014, No. 3, pp. 63–69.

31 On the contrary, there was not mentioned anything about the Zaporozhian Cossacks during the negotiations. L. SVOBODA, *Diplomatické vzťahy*, p. 65.

32 Antoni WALEWSKI, *Historia wyzwolenia II*, pp. 36–37; L. SVOBODA, *Diplomatické vzťahy*, pp. 71–73.

33 A. F. PRIBRAM, *Österreichische Vermittlungs-Politik*, pp. 423–424; L. SVOBODA, *Vztah mezi Habsburky a Ruskem*, pp. 80–81; IDEM, *Diplomatické vzťahy*, pp. 76–77.

his ancestors and offered the both antagonized sides to arrange peace negotiations.³⁴ The role of mediator – peacemaker in solving the conflict between the both powers belonged to exceedingly prestigious matters in the perspective of observing contemporaries. Also in this case the son of Ferdinand II of Habsburg appointed himself to the position of a make-peace who reputedly wanted no further unfortunate warfare and bloodsheds within Christian countries.³⁵ The mediation, though, brought a welcomed possibility to influence the conditions under which the peace was negotiated and determine these according to the profit of the mediator.³⁶ In case of Mid-Eastern Europe such a function had been permanently striven for by two sworn rivals – the Habsburg Monarchy and France.³⁷

At the Viennese court there were launched feverish arrangements for sending a delegation to the heart of Russian state which brought considerable difficulties. The emperor's party was well aware of the everyday life, values and behaviour patterns commonly accepted in that geographically remote area. For that reason the diplomats were ordered to study the final reports of their predecessors in order to gain necessary knowledge of everyday life in Moscow and potential conflict situations which they should have been able to prevent. These documents served also as a kind of “manuals” how to act during solving similar problems.³⁸ But the last Habsburg delegate in the capital of the Grand Duchy of Moscow had been Heinrich von Logau 50 years earlier (in 1604).³⁹ So the new diplomatic mission could have been sent there only on the basis of some outdated fifty-year-old information gathered from court archives and other variously reliable reports and tales about distant Moscow.⁴⁰

Also the choice of an appropriate diplomat increased the attention of highest imperial officials. In this case there were more important communicative and language skills

34 Ibidem, pp. 77–79; Mark HENGERER, *Kaiser Ferdinand III. (1608–1657). Eine Biographie*, Wien – Köln – Weimar 2012, pp. 334–335.

35 More about this in the Instruction by Ferdinand III of Habsburg to Allegretto Allegretti and Johann Dietrich of Lorbach dated on 5. 6. 1655. I. SCHWARCZ, *Отношения Габсбургов с Россией и Украиной*, pp. 234–236.

36 Barbara STOLLBERG-RILINGER, *Parteiische Vermittler? Die Westfälischen Friedensverhandlungen 1643–1648*, in: Gerd Althoff (ed.), *Frieden stiften. Vermittlung und Konfliktlösung vom Mittelalter bis heute*, Darmstadt 2011, pp. 124–146; Hermann KAMP, *Soziologie der Mediation aus historischer Perspektive*, *Zeitschrift für Rechtssoziologie* 36, 2016, pp. 139–153.

37 Z. VESELÝ, *Dějiny diplomacie*, p. 79.

38 Jan Paul NIEDERKORN, *Diplomaten-Instruktionen in der Frühen Neuzeit*, in: Anita Hipfinger – Josef Löffler – Jan Paul Niederkorn – Martin Scheutz – Thomas Winkelbauer – Jakob Wührer (eds.), *Ordnung durch Tinte und Feder? Genese und Wirkung von Instruktionen im zeitlichen Längsschnitt vom Mittelalter bis zum 20. Jahrhundert*, Wien – München 2012, pp. 73–84.

39 F. von ADELUNG, *Kritisch-literarische Übersicht*, pp. 146–156.

40 Ibidem, pp. 92–93.

exercisable in the destination rather than his social status or geographical knowledge. Therefore the Habsburg diplomacy often used the persons of Slavic origin with regards to their language similarities with Russian language also in later years.⁴¹ On 12th April 1655 Ferdinand III of Habsburg appointed Allegretto Allegretti (a court chaplain and native of Dubrovnik) and Erasmus Constantine Sattlow (a secretary of the Imperial Council of War, i. e. *Hofkriegsrat*) the leader delegates. The second of these however resigned from his position and was replaced by Johann Dietrich of Lorbach.⁴² The delegation left Vienna on 27th July 1655 and it festively entered Moscow on 7th October 1655. After the following lengthy and not seldom tempestuous conferences, Aleksey I Mikhailovich agreed with the Habsburg mediation as well as with the cessation of hostilities until peace talks.⁴³ These started in mid-August 1656 in Lithuanian Vilna where the emperor was represented by Allegretto Allegretti and Johann Dietrich of Lorbach themselves.⁴⁴ During the negotiations the Polish delegation granted several concessions and even agreed with the election of the Russian tsar the future Polish king while John II Casimir being still alive (on the condition that he would come to rule the Rzeczpospolita after the death of the current sovereign). However, there was not concluded any peace between the antagonized sides but only ratified the truce.⁴⁵

The diplomatic mission of Allegretto Allegretti and Johann Dietrich of Lorbach was followed by a legacy of imperial resident in Poland Johann Christoph of Fragstein and Christoph Beuer of Binnen.⁴⁶ Their main task was to inform Aleksey I Mikhailovich about the death of Ferdinand III of Habsburg and accession of his son Leopold I to the throne, who also expressed a wish to maintain friendly relations with the Grand Duchy of Moscow. There was, however, a much more important point represented by ensuring

41 Hugo WECZERKA, *Sebastian Glavinich und seine Schilderung des Moskowitischen Reiches*, in: idem (ed.), *Rossica externa. Studien zum 15. – 17. Jahrhundert. Festgabe für Paul Johansen zum 60. Geburtstag*, Marburg 1963, pp. 125–156; Iskra SCHWARCZ, *Die diplomatischen Beziehungen Österreich – Russland in der zweiten Hälfte des XVII. Jahrhunderts*, Mitteilungen des Österreichischen Staatsarchivs 50, 2003, pp. 29–41.

42 A. F. PRIBRAM, *Österreichische Vermittlungs-Politik*, pp. 424–425; L. SVOBODA, *Diplomatické vzťahy*, pp. 93–94.

43 Ibidem, pp. 95–113; I. SCHWARCZ, *Отношения Габсбургов с Россией и Украиной*.

44 *Памятники дипломатических сношений*, pp. 470–471; L. SVOBODA, *Diplomatické vzťahy*, p. 154.

45 A. F. PRIBRAM, *Österreichische Vermittlungs-Politik*, pp. 423–444; Iskra SCHWARCZ, *Вена-Москва: дипломатические отношения в середине XVII века*, in: *Славяне и их соседи. Средние века – раннее новое время. Вып. 9. Славяне и немцы. 1000–летнее соседство: мирные связи и конфликты*, Moscow 1999, pp. 180–188; L. SVOBODA, *Diplomatické vzťahy*, pp. 162–204.

46 Monika KONRÁDOVÁ – Rostislav SMÍŠEK, *Jan Kryštof z Fragsteinu a jeho diplomatická cesta do Ruska v letech 1657–1658. Teze edičního projektu*, Opera historica 16, 2015, No. 2, pp. 247–268; Monika KONRÁDOVÁ – Rostislav SMÍŠEK (eds.), *Mezi Vídní, Varšavou a Moskvou. Diplomatické mise Jana Kryštofa z Fragsteinu do Moskvy v letech 1657–1658*, České Budějovice 2017 (in print).

the peace talks between the Rzeczpospolita and Russia to continue because their mutual relations seemed to begin getting worse again. The Habsburgs moreover needed to preserve the war *status quo*. Thanks to the current conflict (1656–1658) namely the tsar army was fighting Swedish forces in Baltic region, mostly in Ingria and Livonia, due to which the Swedish troops could not threaten the Holy Roman Empire territories.⁴⁷ The actual diplomatic negotiations in Moscow which lasted more than a month finally failed due to bitter disputes mostly concerning appropriate titling of Leopold I of Habsburg and Aleksey I Mikhailovich, allegedly disdainful behaviour of the Russian side and persistence of Johann Christoph of Fragstein.⁴⁸ He also refused to bring back to Vienna a tsar's personal letter addressed to the young Habsburg because in its title there was used a wrong prerogative, which purportedly disparaged his leading position within the presumable hierarchy of European sovereigns, so Fragstein left it on the table in his Moscow room.⁴⁹

Travel and stay in Moscow as a permanent sequence of conflicts

The preserved archival documents reflect that the Habsburg delegates had prepared for their mission in advance and consequently endeavoured to fulfil the commonly accepted patterns of behaviour and decency. For these reasons they also stopped by the borders of the Moscow state and asked the local authorities for the permission to enter and appropriate introduction to the area ruled by Aleksey I Mikhailovich.⁵⁰ The tsar by contrast sent towards them some of his servants by whom he expressed his respect to the enterprising monarch. At the same time, he secured the voyagers during their travel

47 An Instruction by Leopold I of Habsburg to Johann Christoph of Fragstein and Christoph Beuer of Binnen dated on 6. 5. 1657. Österreichisches Staatsarchiv Wien (= ÖStA Wien), Haus-, Hof-, und Staatsarchiv (= HHStA), Staatenabteilungen, Polen I, Kart. 69, Konv. Mai, fol. 19–26. Comp. Oleg Alexandrovič KURBATOV, *Русско-шведская война 1656–58 гг.: проблемы критики военно-исторических источников*, in: Vera Alexandrovna Kovrigina (ed.), *Россия и Швеция в средневековье и новое время: архивное и музейное наследие*, Moscow 2002, pp. 150–166.

48 Klaus MEYER, „*Kayserliche grossmächtigkeit*“. *Titularfragen bei den Verhandlungen zwischen Kaiser und Zar 1661/62*, in: H. Weczerka (ed.), *Rossica externa*, pp. 115–124, here p. 122; I. SCHWARCZ, *Die kaiserlichen Gesandten*, p. 276.

49 A Final report by Christoph Beuer of Binnen dated on 27. 5. 1658 and a Final report by Johann Christoph of Fragstein dated on 18. 6. 1658. ÖStA Wien, HHStA, Staatenabteilungen, Russland I, Kart. 10, Konv. 1, fol. 117–124; Biblioteka Uniwersytecka we Wrocławiu (= BUW), Oddział Starych Druków, akcesja 1988.16, Fragstein, fol. 1–8.

50 An entry in a Travel diary by Christoph Beuer of Binnen dated on 10. 7. 1657; also a Letter by Johann Christoph of Fragstein to Leopold I of Habsburg dated 30. 7. 1657; and the Final report by Johann Christoph of Fragstein dated on 18. 6. 1658. *Ibidem*. Comp. Olga Genievna AGEVA, *Дипломатический церемониал императорской России. XVIII век*, Moscow 2012, p. 40.

through the foreign territory.⁵¹ The welcome, greetings and introducing to the country were in the period society perceived as a kind of initiative ritual for the future mutual interaction of the newly-come visitors and their hosts. Its procedure reflected the current international political matters as well as the power relations between the both states. There were ordinarily articulated several bilateral expectations and objectives.⁵²

Although the Habsburg diplomats tried to prevent possible conflict situations, the first disagreements repeatedly came already during their travel to Moscow. Johann Christoph of Fragstein and also Christoph Beuer of Binnen considered their more than fourteen-day long waiting at the Russian borders for the permission to enter the country as egregious.⁵³ They also complained about the acting of tsar clerks and military officers who gradually welcomed and visited them in towns which they went through. According to the opinion of Johann Christoph of Fragstein, they did not have any notion about elementary good manners. For example in Nowidwur was Fragstein visited by a certain captain. “*Who, having no pertinent authority, entered my dwelling. And so I, not willing to let that man crossing my threshold, stepped forward to him; and also let him greet me by kissing my hand.*”⁵⁴ Much bigger disillusion of the diplomat’s was caused by intercepting his delegation nearby town Borisov. There they had to spend approximately 20 weeks in quarantine because of spread plague epidemic. The whole building, in which they stayed,

51 Donald E. QUELLER, *The Office of Ambassador in the Middle Ages*, Princeton 1967, pp. 191–192; Claudia GARNIER, “*Wer meinen Herrn ehrt, den ehre ich billig auch*”. *Symbolische Kommunikationsformen bei Gesandtenempfangen am Moskauer Hof im 16. und 17. Jahrhundert*, Jahrbuch für Kommunikationsgeschichte 7, 2005, pp. 27–51, here p. 31.

52 Esther GOODY, “*Greeting*”, “*Begging*”, and the *Presentation of Respect*, in: Jean Sybil La Fontaine (ed.), *The Interpretation of Ritual: Essays in Honour of A. I. Richards*, London 1972, pp. 39–71.

53 More about this in the Letter by Johann Christoph of Fragstein to Leopold I of Habsburg dated on 30. 7. 1657 and the Letter by Christoph Beuer of Binnen to Johann Adolf of Schwarzenberg dated on 29. 7. 1657. ÖStA Wien, HHStA, Staatenabteilungen, Russland I, Kart. 9, Konv. 3, fol. 112–115; Státní oblastní archiv (= SOA) Třeboň, oddělení Český Krumlov, Rodinný archiv (= RA) Schwarzenberků, fasc. 373, fol. 756. There has to be noted that Johann Christoph of Fragstein had to follow the generally accepted rules practised in tsar Russia. These meant that no servant was allowed to let any foreign delegations in the Russian territories without the awareness and written permission of Aleksey I Mikhailovich. More about this e.g. in the Letter by Aleksey I Mikhailovich to Vasil Borisovich Sheremetev dated on 17./27. 9. 1657. *Памятники дипломатических сношений*, pp. 674–685. Further see: *Ibidem*, pp. 687–688.

54 “... [q]ui absque ulla apud eosdem alioquin solita competentia ad meum hospitium venit et me ne extra limen quidem mei cubiculi eidem obviam procedentem etiam osculo manus consalutavit.” The Final report by Johann Christoph of Fragstein dated on 18. 6. 1658. BUW, Oddział Starych Druków, akcesja 1988.16, Fragstein, fol. 1–8. Comp. also e.g. the Letter by Johann Christoph of Fragstein to Leopold I of Habsburg dated on 25. 2. 1658. ÖStA Wien, HHStA, Staatenabteilungen, Russland I, Kart. 9, Konv. 3, fol. 14–23, 47–52.

was moreover guarded by an armed patrol counting 27 men, who allegedly watched also the very door into the diplomat's room.⁵⁵

During the mentioned interception, the Russian party even tried to utterly isolate Fragstein and his suite from the outer world. They neither let him to inform via letters the Viennese court about the journey, nor to communicate with diplomatic missions of other European powers which were also retained there.⁵⁶ The imperial diplomat considered such a local stay to be a kind of purpose imprisonment or detention because the Russian delegations, including couriers, were allowed to pass through the same place freely.⁵⁷ That was why he did not respect the ban to communicate with anyone and secretly exchanged encrypted messages mostly with a Polish delegate Stephan Franciszek Medeksza of Prószcza.⁵⁸ With help of Medeksza he also secretly sent several coded letters to Vienna. Some of them were, however, seized by the Russian party who had it translated and sent to Moscow.⁵⁹ Fragstein sharply protested against such procedures: “[B]y this tort there was violated the right of nations... Indeed by such barbarian and negligent nation there was achieved nothing in terms of honour.”⁶⁰ And these steps only deepened the mutual distrust. On the other hand, the encryption he used reputedly increased Russian suspicion about

55 The Letter by Christoph Beuer of Binnen to an unknown addressee dated on 28. 10. 1657. Ibidem, fol. 131. Further compare also the Letter by Johann Christoph of Fragstein to Stephan Franciszek Medeksza of Prószcza. Władysław SEREDYŃSKI (ed.), *Stefana Franciszka z Prószcza Medekszy, sekretarza Jana Kazimierza, sędziego ziemskiego kowieńskiego, Księga pamiętnicza wydarzeń zaszłych na Litwie 1654–1668*, Kraków 1875, p. 66; Klaus MÜLLER, *Das kaiserliche Gesandtschaftswesen im Jahrhundert nach dem Westfälischen Frieden (1648–1740)*, Bonn 1976, p. 145, note 4.

56 The Letters by Johann Christoph of Fragstein to Leopold I of Habsburg dated on 2. 1. 1658 and Christoph Beuer of Binnen to an unknown addressee dated on 3. 1. 1658. ÖStA Wien, HHStA, Staatenabteilungen, Russland I, Kart. 10, Konv. 1, fol. 1–2, 130; I. SCHWARCZ, *Отношения Габсбургов с Россией и Украиной*, pp. 297–298, document No. 17.

57 A Letter draft by Christoph Beuer of Binnen to an unknown addressee dated on 28. 10. 1657. ÖStA Wien, HHStA, Staatenabteilungen, Russland I, Kart. 9, Konv. 3, fol. 131.

58 He besides addressed also a Brandenburg diplomat Friedrich Joachim of Borrenthin. W. SEREDYŃSKI (ed.), *Stefana Franciszka z Prószcza Medekszy, sekretarza Jana Kazimierza, sędziego ziemskiego kowieńskiego, Księga pamiętnicza*, pp. 78, 79–80, 81, 85, 87, 88–89, 90–91, 93–94, 99, 102. Comp. Oleg Sergejevič ŠAKLEIN, *Миссия бранденбургского посла Иоахима фон Боррентина в Россию в 1657–1658 гг.*, Вестник Волжского университета имени В. Н. Татищева 2012, No. 1, pp. 199–214.

59 The Letter by Christoph Beuer of Binnen to an unknown addressee dated on 28. 10. 1657. ÖStA Wien, HHStA, Staatenabteilungen, Russland I, Kart. 9, Konv. 3, fol. 131; W. SEREDYŃSKI (ed.), *Stefana Franciszka z Prószcza Medekszy, sekretarza Jana Kazimierza, sędziego ziemskiego kowieńskiego, Księga pamiętnicza*, pp. 74–75, 79–80.

60 “... de violato iure gentium de hac iniuria. ... Sed apud gentem barbaram et honestatis incuriam nihil profectum est.” One of its effects was for example the reinforcement of their guards. It is referred to in the Final report by Johann Christoph of Fragstein dated on 18. 6. 1658. BUW, Oddział Starych Druków, akcesja 1988.16, Fragstein, fol. 4.

Fragstein's suite. All these assumed or actual injustices were by Fragstein considered as disregarding the reputation of Leopold I of Habsburg and breaching the hospitality rights.⁶¹

Another bitter dispute came shortly before the ceremonial entry of the delegation to Moscow. When the commissioners appointed by the tsar were to welcome the arriving delegates in front of the capital of the Grand Duchy and greet them, they insisted upon Habsburg diplomats dismounting from their horses or getting off their carriages sooner than the commissioners themselves.⁶² They argued by talking on behalf of the tsar himself. The Mid-Europeans regarded the raised query extremely inordinate and emphatically objected to such Russian dictation. According to Allegretto Allegretti "*the legates of the Roman Emperor, the supreme sovereign of Christendom, respected by their master – the Grand Tsar, cannot be equalized to messengers of other rulers and they must be paid higher tribute for they are servants of a greater master*".⁶³ On the basis of commonly accepted standards of behaviour, the West-Europeans viewed the hosts to be first in getting off the carriages before arrived foreigners as corresponding good manners.⁶⁴ On the contrary, the tsar's commissioners considered such acting to be extremely improper and rude because it was inconsistent with the conventions in their country.⁶⁵

Consequently, the tsar's commissioners got in an argument with the Habsburg delegates which lasted possibly more than an hour. They were referring to former diplomats sent by the Habsburgs who allegedly always respected the Russian customs and made the mentioned gesture, whereas the delegates were disproving it by explaining that their duty was to defend good reputation and honour of their sovereign.⁶⁶ They at the same time clearly expressed that they were well aware of the former ceremonial reception procedures of their predecessors.⁶⁷ The Russian party had finally always conformed to the demands

61 Ibidem, fol. 5.

62 Leonid JUZEFOVIČ, *Путь посла. Русский посольский обычай. Обиход. Этикет. Церемониал. Конец XV – первая половина XVII вв.*, Moscow 2007, p. 90. Comp. Dieter LOHMEIER (ed.), *Adam Olearius, Vermehrte Neue Beschreibung der Muscovitischen vnd Persischen Reyse*, Tübingen 1971, p. 127; O. S. ŠAKLEIN, *Миссия Иоахима фон Боррентина*, p. 337; I. SCHWARCZ, *Die kaiserlichen Gesandten*, pp. 269–271.

63 "... li ablegati dell'Imperatore Romano, sovrano Prencipe della Christianità, riconsciuto per tale dall'istesso Gran Zar lor Signore, non s'havevano da'equiparare con quelli daltri potentati, e <che> gli sono dovuti maggiori gradi d'honor, quanto sono servitori di maggior padrone." I. SCHWARCZ, *Отношения Габсбургов с Россией и Украиной*, p. 256. See also *Памятники дипломатических сношений*, pp. 347–350.

64 O. G. AGEEVA, *Дипломатический церемониал*, p. 131.

65 I. SCHWARCZ, *Die kaiserlichen Gesandten*, p. 270.

66 The Letter by Johann Christoph of Fragstein to Johann Adolf of Schwarzenberg dated on 8. 6. 1657. SOA Třeboň, oddělení Český Krumlov, RA Schwarzenberků, fasc. 373, fol. 784–785.

67 Mirko DEANOVIĆ (ed.), *Frano Dživa Gundulića i njegov put u Moskvu 1655. godine*, Starine 41, 1948, pp. 7–59, here p. 38; L. SVOBODA, *Diplomatické vztahy*, pp. 101–102; I. SCHWARCZ, *Die kaiserlichen Gesandten*, pp. 269–270.

of Habsburg delegates and its representatives eventually promised to get off the carriages simultaneously with the foreign diplomats.⁶⁸

Nevertheless, each side was searching for other advantages and tried to achieve symbolic power superiority and claim more respect at least by various minor gestures. This way there was made a bargain between the Habsburg delegation lead by Johann Christoph of Fragstein and the tsar's commissioners in front of Moscow on 1st February 1658. The first to get off the carriage would be Christoph Beuer of Binnen simultaneously with a younger tsar commissioner Grigorij Bogdanov. The same step would have been then made by the Baron of Fragstein together with Jakov Nikitich Licharev. When the diplomat of Leopold I of Habsburg noticed, though, that the older courtier of Aleksey I Mikhailovich rather delayed leaving his means of transport and therefore was trying to achieve a slight privilege, he regarded that to be an obvious breach of mutual agreement. So Fragstein immediately beckoned Beuer of Binnen to return back in the carriage. After the both sides clarified their viewpoints via messengers, whereas the Habsburg delegates insisted on meeting the arranged conditions, the exiting proceeded according to the previously agreed order.⁶⁹

As the reports and other written records by some Early Modern diplomats arriving to Moscow show, the dispute of Johann Christoph of Fragstein and Christoph Beuer of Binnen with Jakov Nikitich Licharev and Grigorij Bogdanov was not any rare or exceptional case. The events experienced by Friedrich Joachim of Borrenthin, Sigismund of Herberstein, Adam Olearius, Allegretto Allegretti, Augustin Mayer of Mayerberg, Johann Georg Korb and many others unambiguously prove that such events traditionally concerned receptions of abroad delegations in front of Moscow.⁷⁰ The Russian party strived to symbolically express their own power superiority and increase personal prestige by such practice "*especially towards the foreigners*".⁷¹ Another explanation for this behaviour of the commissaries of Aleksey I Mikhailovich was offered in a text by Adam Olearius, a traveller and diplomat serving the duke Frederick III of Holstein-Gottorp. According to his opinion, the tsar officials expressed a kind of their personal loyalty to the monarch.

68 The Letter by Johann Christoph of Fragstein to Leopold I of Habsburg dated on 25. 2. 1658 and the Fragstein's Final report dated on 18. 6. 1658. ÖStA Wien, HHStA, Staatenabteilungen, Russland I, Kart. 10, Konv. 1, fol. 47–52; BUW, Oddział Starych Druków, akcesja 1988.16, Fragstein.

69 Ibidem. Further compare C. GARNIER, „*Wer meinen Herrn ehrt, den ehre ich billig auch*“, pp. 32–33.

70 Georg von RAUCH, *Moskau und der Westen im Spiegel der schwedischen diplomatischen Berichte der Jahre 1651–1655*, in: Georg von Rauch (ed.), *Studien über das Verhältnis Russlands zu Europa*, Darmstadt 1964, pp. 23–67, here p. 59–60; Gerhard KORB (ed.), *Johan Georg Korb, Tagebuch der Reise nach Russland*, Graz 1952, p. 52; L. JUZEFOVIČ, *Путь посла*, p. 90; O. S. ŠAKLEIN, *Миссия Иоахима фон Боррентина*, p. 337.

71 D. LOHMEIER (ed.), *Adam Olearius*, p. 189; C. GARNIER, „*Wer meinen Herrn ehrt, den ehre ich billig auch*“, p. 34.

Therefore they had to turn to similar steps as often as possible not to fall into disfavour with the tsar. Otherwise they would face the threat of traditional Russian punishment – flogging by knouts.⁷²

Within this context, it is also necessary to draw attention to completely different perception of the significance of ceremonial entries of foreign delegates to destinations in the eyes of West-European powers' representatives on the one hand and the Russian tsar on the other hand.⁷³ In the first case it was realised at the expense of the incoming diplomats. The performance itself served as an instrument for presenting the majesty and glory of monarch who was directly represented by the diplomat in this remote geographical area. It offered a welcomed opportunity for the delegating sovereign as well as for his deputy to legitimize his real (or assumed) power and show wealth and social status in public. The propagation itself was realised by a spectacular parade, costly materials used, allegorical carriage decorations, thoroughbred horses and also numerous participants in cavalcade.⁷⁴ The Russian sovereign on the contrary used the mentioned ceremonial to visualise his own person. This was connected with lending his personal splendid carriage and thoroughbred horses from tsar stables by which the diplomats should have passed the ritual.⁷⁵ These arrangements of all the necessities financed by the tsar treasury formed

72 “Solche Gebräuche müssen des Grosfürsten fühnehmste Bediente, sonderlich die Pristaffen (denen etliche Dolmetscher in Mußcow nachaffen) ihres Herren halber, so viel ihnen müglich, genaw in acht nehmen, so ferne sie nicht wollen in Ungnaden kommen oder mit der Knutpeitsche bestrafft werden.” D. LOHMEIER (ed.), *Adam Olearius*, p. 127. More about this traditional Russian punishment by John P. LEDONNE, *Absolutism and Ruling Class: The Formation of the Russian Political Order, 1700–1825*, New York – Oxford 1991, p. 215; Josef KOLÁČEK (ed.), *Jiří David ze Zdic, Novodobý stav Velké Rusi neboli Moskevská. Přijetí a vyhnání otců Tovaryšstva Ježíšova. Zburcované převraty a revoluce. Mravy a ctnosti lidu, jak politické tak církevní, krátce sepsané*, Praha – Olomouc 2008, p. 66.

73 K. MÜLLER, *Das kaiserliche Gesandtschaftswesen*, pp. 126–127. Generally to the topic of ceremonial entries Peter JOHANEK – Angelika LAMPEN (eds.), *Adventus. Studien zum herrscherlichen Einzug in die Stadt*, Köln – Weimar – Wien 2009; Harriet RUDOLPH, *Das Reich als Ereignis. Formen und Funktionen der Herrschaftsinszenierung bei Kaisereinzügen (1558–1618)*, Köln – Weimar – Wien 2011.

74 Karl VOCELKA, *Die politische Propaganda Kaiser Rudolfs II. (1576–1612)*, Wien 1981, pp. 121–187. On representative strategies of particular imperial delegates during ceremonial entries to European metropolises in the beginning of the Early Modern Age see: Herbert HAUPT, *Diplomatie und Repräsentation im Dienst des Kaiserhauses. Die öffentlichen Einzüge des Fürsten Joseph Wenzel von Liechtenstein*, in: Reinhold Baumstark (ed.), *Joseph Wenzel von Liechtenstein. Fürst und Diplomat im Europa des 18. Jahrhunderts*, Einsiedeln 1990, pp. 24–53; Rostislav SMÍŠEK, *Anton Florian von Liechtenstein und Rom. Selbstpräsentation eines kaiserlichen Gesandten zum Ausgang des 17. Jahrhunderts*, in: Marek Vařeka – Aleš Zářický (eds.), *Das Fürstenhaus Liechtenstein in der Geschichte der Länder der Böhmisches Krone*, Ostrava – Vaduz 2013, pp. 197–212.

75 Alejandro LÓPEZ ALVAREZ, *Kutschen und Sänften als Macht- und Statussymbole des spanischen Adels im 16. und 17. Jahrhundert. Eine Beschreibung anhand zeitgenössischer Festberichte*, Achse, Rad und Wagen. Beiträge zur Geschichte der Landfahrzeuge 7, 1999, pp. 20–29.

an integral part of representation of the descendants of Vladimir Monomakh. Thereby they symbolically expressed their noble-mindedness, power and wealth.⁷⁶

Further displeasure of the Habsburg delegates was caused also by a regulation that nobody was allowed to leave the interiors of reserved palace until the audience with the tsar (and often also after that) and visit any streets of Moscow. This order was fulfilled by the assigned security guard.⁷⁷ Allegretto Allegretti, Johann Christoph of Fragstein and also Christoph Beuer of Binnen accordingly compared such restrictions to imprisonment: “Thanks to such categorical answer, we had to stay in our dwelling for two whole months like being arrested in prison, having no contact with people...”⁷⁸ Except the worries of the tsar court about the possible communication with diplomatic missions of other foreign powers’ delegations in Moscow, eventually different persons or potential plotting against Aleksey I Mikhailovich, this restrictive regulation can also reflect ceremonial reasons. The Russian party acted in similar way as Western European festival scholarship which did not recommend the diplomats to pass any courtesy visits by other persons, especially other foreign diplomats, until the initial hearing at the monarch.⁷⁹ Doing so, they would have offended his honour and majesty because of visiting him as far as the second one. Providing the main aim of the diplomatic mission to be the official meeting with the monarch and subsequent discussion with the Tsar of Russia, they were to meet him as the first one before any other gatherings.⁸⁰

Not even the course of inaugural audience was spared of various misunderstandings which offered incentives to following quarrels and frictions. These could significantly influence the results of diplomatic mission as appeared also in the case of hearing of Johann Christoph of Fragstein at Aleksey I Mikhailovich on 4th February 1658.⁸¹ According to the Habsburg diplomat, the tsar used utterly inappropriate titling for addressing Leopold I of Habsburg during the discussion. When he was asking about the health of

76 L. JUZEFOVIČ, *Путь посла*, pp. 86–87, 108–111; O. G. AGEJEVA, *Дипломатический церемониал*, pp. 541–542.

77 *Памятники дипломатических сношений*, p. 775. Srov. A. WALEWSKI, *Historia wyzwolenia II*, pp. 208, 295–296; M. DEANOVIĆ (ed.), *Frano Dživa Gundulića*, p. 44.

78 “*Con così categorica risposta vissimo nel nostro quartiere duoi mesi intieri come in una prigione rinchiusi, senza comercio humano...*” I. SCHWARCZ, *Отношения Габсбургов с Россией и Украиной*, p. 256. Comp. the entry in the Travel diary by Christoph Beuer of Binnen dated on 1. 2. 1658, Beuer’s Final report dated on 27. 5. 1658 and the Final report by Johann Christoph of Fragstein dated on 18. 6. 1658. ÖStA Wien, HHStA, Staatenabteilungen, Russland I, Kart. 10, Konv. 1, fol. 117–124; BUW, Oddział Starych Druków, akcesja 1988.16, Fragstein; L. SVOBODA, *Diplomatické vzťahy*, pp. 145–146.

79 I. SCHWARCZ, *Отношения Габсбургов с Россией и Украиной*, p. 256; William J. ROOSEN, *The Age of Louis XIV: The Rise of Modern Diplomacy*, Cambridge 1976, pp. 150–157.

80 L. JUZEFOVIČ, *Путь посла*, pp. 107–108.

81 More about this in *Памятники дипломатических сношений*, pp. 819–820.

Ferdinand III of Habsburg's son, he did not call him a "Brother" and also omitted some gestures generally used among Christian sovereigns during their mutual contacts – above all he did not whip off when pronouncing the name of young Habsburg.⁸² Moreover, when Fragstein wanted to pass his letter of credence into the hands of the tsar, Aleksey I Mikhailovich touched it only reluctantly and wanted it passed to a *duma dyak* Almaz Ivanovich Ivanov. So Fragstein immediately pulled his hand with the letter back.⁸³ On the contrary, the Russian side perceived this enforcement as a big impertinence and breach of elementary manners. For them there were possible only exceptional opportunities for direct contacts between the tsar and subjects of another monarch. In the absolute majority of cases the communication was realised by tsar's high courtly officials. If he had approached a diplomat or taken some documents himself, such gestures would have been considered as an extraordinary manifestation of grace towards the diplomat and also the sovereign represented by him.⁸⁴

During the following discussions with tsar's high officials there burst a bitter exchange of views between the both sides because Johann Christoph of Fragstein objected to in his perspective inappropriate acting of Aleksey I Mikhailovich; arguing that he only demanded the same ceremonial and ritual elements and gestures which there had been granted to his predecessor Allegretto Allegretti in 1655.⁸⁵ While in case of calling the young Habsburg a "Brother" the tsar's officials admitted the requested title because also Leopold called Aleksey I Mikhailovich with the same term, in the event of "whipping off" they refused to compromise. Even after Fragstein referred to the fact that: "[I]t used to be customary among all Christian monarchs to ask each other about health bareheaded",⁸⁶ the Russian party replied with a logic counter-argument: "While their Grand Duke had always wore a crown on his head during the public audiences, the other Christian sovereigns had been used to carry only a cap." Therefore he only touched it.⁸⁷

82 Comp. J. HENNINGS, *The Semiotics of Diplomatic Dialogue*, pp. 535–536.

83 "*Dum ego manum meam necdum removissem, suam prophanter applicaret, inconvenientem esse ratus similem processum fortiter dictas credentiales retinui, donec de novo, prout decebat, easdem magnus dux reciperet et demum memorati affini suo tenendas traderet.*" The Final report by Johann Christoph of Fragstein dated on 18. 6. 1658. BUW, Oddział Starych Druków, akcesja 1988.16, Fragstein, fol. 4.

84 L. JUZEFOVIČ, *Путь посла*, p. 200; Sebastian LAMBERTZ, *Das diplomatische Zeremoniell am Moskauer Hof als Ausdruck großfürstlicher Herrschaftsansprüche*, Noe. Das Onlinejournal des Kölner Forums für Geschichte und Kultur Osteuropas 12, 2013, No. 2, pp. 23–34, here p. 25.

85 I. SCHWARCZ, *Отношения Габсбургов с Россией и Украиной*, p. 257. Comp. L. SVOBODA, *Diplomatické vzťahy*, p. 122.

86 "... *inter omnes principes christianos id moris esset detecto capite alter de alterius salute sciscitari.*" The Final report by Johann Christoph of Fragstein dated on 18. 6. 1658. BUW, Oddział Starych Druków, akcesja 1988.16, Fragstein, fol. 8.

87 "*Dum magnus eorundem dux in publicis audientiis coronam semper gestet in capite, reliqui vero principes christiani pileum tantum eam occasione soleant gestare.*" Ibidem. Comp. *Памятники*

The tsar's commissioners also considered the demand of Habsburg diplomats to be treated in the same way as in case of the delegation lead by Allegretto Alleghetti at the turn of years 1655 and 1656 as faint. In the Russian perspective the delegates of Leopold I of Habsburg should have kept in view the different ranks of both crowned heads.⁸⁸ Whilst the Russian sovereign had the title of tsar, the descendant of Ferdinand III of Habsburg could for that time perform only as the Hungarian and Bohemian king because he had not been elected the Holy Roman emperor so far.⁸⁹ This had to be necessarily respected during their mutual interaction. Therefore Fragstein was not in any case allowed to demand such a symbolic gesture from the monarch who was higher socially situated in the notional hierarchy of Early Modern sovereigns.⁹⁰ In addition, Aleksey I Mikhailovich reputedly paid him more respect (allegedly only because of his friendship and sympathy) than it was customary towards a lower situated monarch.⁹¹

Probably the sharpest conflict was caused by inappropriate usage of titling concerning the both monarchs.⁹² The first hints of that appeared already at the very borders of the Rzeczpospolita and Russian Tsardom where the delegation was kept waiting for permission to enter the country ruled by Aleksey I Mikhailovich. There a Grodno voivode Bogdan Aprelev complained via his messenger about wrong titling of the tsar stated in the passport of Johann Christoph of Fragstein. While the Vienna court used the phrase of "*Serenissimus Magnus Moscoviae Dux*" in the document, the tsar's official demanded the formulation of "*Magnus Moscoviae Czar*". According to Aprjelev's opinion, the term of tsar meant in the Russian mind the same as an emperor ("*Caesar*").⁹³ On the other hand, Christoph Beuer of Binnen noted in his travel diary that Bogdan Aprelev protested against the statement of "*Magnus Moscoviae Dux*" and demanded it to be replaced by expression of "*Czarea Majestas*".⁹⁴ Johann Christoph of Fragstein apologized to the voivode for the

дипломатических сношений, pp. 828, 833; S. LAMBERTZ, *Das diplomatische Zeremoniell*, p. 26.

88 William ROOSEN, *Early Modern Diplomatic Ceremonial. A Systems Approach*, *The Journal of Modern History* 52, 1980, p. 460; Jiří HRBEK, *Postavení diplomata v mezinárodním systému poloviny 17. století*, in: *Od konfesijní konfrontace ke konfesijnímu míru, Ústí nad Orlicí 2008*, pp. 222–234, here p. 226; Zdeněk VESELÝ, *Diplomacie. Teorie – praxe – dějiny*, Plzeň 2011, pp. 244–245.

89 Jiří KUBEŠ, *Trnitá cesta Leopolda I. za říšskou korunou (1657–1658). Volby a korunovace ve Svaté říši římské v raném novověku*, České Budějovice 2009.

90 *Памятники дипломатических сношений*, pp. 825–826, 835. There has to be noted that a ruling sovereign titled the "king" was not allowed to claim the prerogative of "*Majestas*" in this period but was commonly titled by the term of "*Serenitas*". A. WALEWSKI, *Historia wyzwolenia II*, p. 39.

91 *Памятники дипломатических сношений*, p. 835.

92 K. MEYER, „*Kaysyerliche grossmächtigkei*“; I. SCHWARCZ, *Die kaiserlichen Gesandten*, pp. 274–278.

93 The Letter draft by Christoph Beuer of Binnen to Johann Walderode of Eckhausen dated on 29. 7. 1657. ÖStA Wien, HHStA, Staatenabteilungen, Russland I, Kart. 9, Konv. 3, fol. 110.

94 The entry in the Travel diary by Christoph Beuer of Binnen about the course of diplomatic mission to Moscow dated on 14. 7. 1657. *Ibidem*, Kart. 10, Konv. 1, fol. 209.

mentioned offence explaining that the Vienna Court Chancery was not used to state all the prerogatives of monarchs in similar documents. It was no intention of Leopold I of Habsburg to depreciate the honour of Aleksey I Mikhailovich. To appease the official of Grodno, Fragstein also promised that the tsar would not be denied any other titles. He allegedly even wanted to assign him prerogatives which had not been used any time before by any delegates of foreign powers.⁹⁵

As the votum of the Privy Council (*Geheimer Rat*), an advisory board of Leopold I of Habsburg in home and abroad politics of the Habsburg Monarchy, from the 19th September 1657 indicates, the Viennese court did not pay any attention to possible problems with appropriate addressing of the Russian monarch.⁹⁶ However, Johann Christoph of Fragstein did not underestimate the above-mentioned reproach. He was well aware of such disputes over titling thanks to the reports of his predecessors, especially by Allegretto Allegretti. Some of these lengthy controversies remained unsolved until his time.⁹⁷ According to his point of view, the inappropriately chosen titling of the tsar in Fragstein's passport could have been the reason of more than the three-week long waiting for the permission to enter the Russian territory.⁹⁸ He consequently ended his considerations by a prophetic statement: "*It seems that the more times mentioned voivode was appeased by this information. Once, the time will show if there arise other disorders in this matter.*"⁹⁹

The Fragstein's presentiment came true already during the inaugural audience on 4th February 1658.¹⁰⁰ There he noticed that the Russian interpreter did not use the predicate "*Majestas*". So he protested against such practice immediately during the following conference. Also the representatives of the Grand Duke pointed out that Johann Christoph of Fragstein addressed their master using only the phrase of "*Euere Czarische Großmächtigkeit*" and not "*Majestas*", which had been allegedly done also by the delegates

95 The Letter by Johann Christoph of Fragstein to Leopold I of Habsburg dated on 30. 7. 1657. Comp. the entry in the Travel diary by Christoph Beuer of Binnen about the course of diplomatic mission to Moscow dated on 19. 7. 1657. Ibidem, Kart. 9, Konv. 3, fol. 112–115 and 207.

96 The Votum of the Privy Council addressed to Leopold I of Habsburg dated on 19. 9. 1657. Ibidem, fol. 120–121.

97 A. WALEWSKI, *Historia wyzwolenia II*, p. 39; L. SVOBODA, *Diplomatické vzťahy*, pp. 74–75, 106–107.

98 ÖStA Wien, HHStA, Staatenabteilungen, Polen I, Kart. 69, Konv. Mai, fol. 37; *Памятники дипломатических сношений*, pp. 796–798.

99 "*Videbatur saepius dictus palatinus informatione ista quietatus, utrum vero alii quidpiam in hoc puncto difficultatis moturi sint? Tempus aperiet.*" The Letter by Johann Christoph of Fragstein to Leopold I of Habsburg dated on 30. 7. 1657. ÖStA Wien, HHStA, Staatenabteilungen, Russland I, Kart. 9, Konv. 3, fol. 112–115. Similarly also in the Letter by Johann Christoph of Fragstein to Johann Adolf of Schwarzenberg dated on 30. 7. 1657. SOA Třeboň, oddělení Český Krumlov, RA Schwarzenberků, fasc. 373, fol. 757–759.

100 *Памятники дипломатических сношений*, pp. 798–804.

of other countries as well as by the diplomats of Ferdinand III of Habsburg before.¹⁰¹ Moreover, Leopold I of Habsburg stated in his letter to the tsar only the prerogative of “*Praepotens*” or “*Großmächtigkeit*” although the predecessors of the young Habsburg had commonly titled him by the term of “*Potentissimus*”. The above-mentioned terms, according to the opinion of Russian side, did not sufficiently correspond to the prestige of the tsar title.¹⁰²

Fragstein argued that he acted according to the former practice and experience reported by his predecessors Allegretto Allegretti and Johann Dietrich of Lorbach who had never mentioned the predicate of “*Maiestas*” even by a single word.¹⁰³ That was why he requested the tsar’s commissioners to propose him some official document which would have contained the demanded titling. They, however, refused it accusing Allegretti and Lorbach of lying and reporting false information in their texts.¹⁰⁴ To support their demands, the Russian commissioners used in addressing Leopold I of Habsburg only the terms of “*Ihre Königliche Großmächtigkeit*” whereas the titling of the tsar contained “*Maiestas*” category. Fragstein considered such acting as impertinent and very arrogant “*not to let it seem obvious that they were asking for the title, but as they were claiming the due right*”.¹⁰⁵ So he clearly expressed that he would never award Aleksey I Mikhailovich the requested prerogative.¹⁰⁶

Similar behaviour had been, besides, noticed also by Allegretto Allegretti a year before. Shortly before his inaugural audience, he was visited by a certain tsar official who asked him about the prerogatives which the imperial diplomats would concede to the tsar. When they asked that these would be the same as used in the letter of Ferdinand III of Habsburg, he insisted on adding also “the Voivode of Smolensk and the Grand Duke of Lithuania” (these were recently conquered territories).¹⁰⁷ Allegretti was taken aback by his impudence and commented it mockingly: “*There would be only one thing left – if he*

101 Ibidem, pp. 825–826. Comp. K. MEYER, „*Kaysersliche grossmächtigkeit*“, pp. 121–124; I. SCHWARCZ, *Die kaiserlichen Gesandten*, pp. 276–278.

102 *Памятники дипломатических сношений*, pp. 790–792, 823–825; J. HENNINGS, *The Semiotics of Diplomatic Dialogue*, pp. 525–526.

103 *Памятники дипломатических сношений*, p. 831; I. SCHWARCZ, *Отношения Габсбургов с Россией и Украиной*, pp. 255–263.

104 *Памятники дипломатических сношений*, pp. 832–833.

105 “... *ne scilicet titulum istum videantur petere, sed quasi debitum vi extorquere.*” The Final report by Johann Christoph of Fragstein dated on 18. 7. 1658. BUW, *Oddział Starych Druków*, akcesja 1988.16, Fragstein, fol. 15.

106 Comp. L. SVOBODA, *Diplomatické vzťahy*, p. 74.

107 Iskra SCHWARCZ, *Австро-русские дипломатические отношения в первые годы Северной войны*, in: B. N. Florja – L. J. Semenova (eds.), *Русская и украинская дипломатия*, pp. 31–46, here pp. 33–34; L. SVOBODA, *Diplomatické vzťahy*, pp. 106–107; Julija Vladimirovna SITKEVIČ, *Эволюция титулатуры московских князей в практике отношений со странами Центральной*

demanded a title of emperor, when it would be enough to add a single syllable CE to the word tsar” – Cezar = Cesar.¹⁰⁸ He as well dared to make a slight reproach towards the emperor and his predecessors because they, according to Allegretti, were much more benevolent and generous in titling Muscovite Grand Dukes than the other (European) sovereigns and granted the successors of Vladimir Monomakh prerogatives which they had no claim on.¹⁰⁹ If they had granted them particular titles in the past, which he was not sure about himself, there was no wonder that the Russians requested more.¹¹⁰

The above mentioned inquiries eloquently depict the peculiar attitude of Russian side to the usage of appropriate titling of their monarch. The hypersensitivity of the tsar court concerning the titling can be further illustrated with the fact that the missing or inappropriately formulated prerogatives could have become a cause of war declaration.¹¹¹ The acknowledgement of any title of Aleksey I Mikhailovich by the abroad powers at the same time meant the legitimization of his territorial claims concerning a particular conquered area. There was, however, even more important fact that such acknowledgement precisely defined the position of his descendant Fyodor III Alekseyevich Romanov in

и Восточной Европы (последняя четверть XV – первая четверть XVI в.), Журнал международного права и международных отношений 2014, No. 4, pp. 33–37, here p. 35.

- 108 “*Nè gli manca altro per appellarsi Cesari, ch’aggionger unica silaba del CE al zar.*” I. SCHWARCZ, *Отношения Габсбургов с Россией и Украиной*, p. 257. Comp. Marc SZEFTTEL, *The Title of the Muscovite Monarch up to the End of the Seventeenth Century*, Canadian-American Slavic Studies 13, 1979, pp. 59–81; Alexandr Iljič FILJUŠKIN, *Термины “царь” и “царство” на Руси*, Вопросы истории 1997, No. 8, pp. 144–148; Isabel DE MADARIAGA, *Politics and Culture in Eighteenth-Century Russia*, London – New York 2014², pp. 15–39.
- 109 The Letter by Allegretto Allegretti and Johann Dietrich of Lorbach to Leopold I of Habsburg dated on 18. 1. 1656: “....*Decembris vigesima septima, sequenti nempe die nobis a pristafis nostris mane conferentia intimata fuit, et ab ipsis horas aliquot continue petitum, ut in ipsa magno duci suo titulos etiam magni Ducatus Lithuaniae et Smolensci daremus; quod autem a nobis semper resucatum, imo ipsis ostensum est, quod majestas vestra Caesarea ipsi magno duci majores adhuc titulos, quam ipse rex Sveciae et alii darent...*” Augustin THEINER (ed.), *Monuments historiques relatifs aux règnes d’Alexis Michaëlowitch, Féodor III et Pierre le Grand, czars de Russie, extraits des archives du Vatican et de Naples*, Rome 1859, document No. IV, p. 7.
- 110 I. SCHWARCZ, *Отношения Габсбургов с Россией и Украиной*, p. 257. For example the prerogative “*Majestas*” had been used already in year 1514 in a draft agreement concerning coalition against the Jagiellonians by Georg Schnitzenpaumer von Sonneg – a delegate of Maximillian I of Habsburg in Moscow. He titled the Grand Duke of Moscow as “*Kayser und Herrscher aller Rewssen.*” Hans UEBERSBERGER, *Österreich und Russland seit dem Ende des 15. Jahrhunderts*, Wien – Leipzig 1906, p. 80. More about by Sergej Michajlovič KAŠTANOV, *О титуле московских государей в XV–XVIII вв.*, in: Jurij Nikolajevič Afanasjev – Ljubov Viktorovna Stoljarova – Anna Leonidovna Choroškevič (eds.), *Россия в IX–XX веках: проблемы истории, историографии и источниковедения*, Moscow 1999, pp. 181–187; J. V. SITKEVIČ, *Эволюция титулатуры московских князей*, p. 35.
- 111 L. SVOBODA, *Diplomatické vzťahy*, pp. 46–47, 72–73; J. HENNINGS, *The Semiotics of Diplomatic Dialogue*, p. 518.

the hierarchy of European sovereign.¹¹² Also its role in constituting the ancestral identity of the House of Romanov, who succeeded to the Russian throne as lately as in 1613, was no less important.¹¹³ As a relatively “young” dynasty among the European ruling houses, the Romanovs strived to confirm their belonging to this exclusive group of noble individuals. They were related to these, among others, due to the self-presentation referring to inheritors and successors of the ancient Rurik dynasty.¹¹⁴ An integral part of this bond was formed by anxious adherence to all the titles which the last Rurik on the Russian throne – Fyodor I Ivanovich – held until his death in May 1598, possibly the efforts to gain also the new ones.¹¹⁵

The “Muscovites” in the eyes of Johann Christoph of Fragstein

Numerous problems concerning ceremonials, rituals and other matters which Johann Christoph of Fragstein faced during his diplomatic mission often originated also from the fact that he was by Leopold I of Habsburg appointed a lower diplomatic rank than Allegretto Allegretti.¹¹⁶ While the cleric and native of Dubrovnik acted as an envoy (*Abgesandte, посланник*), Fragstein was only granted the status of messenger (*Geschikter, зоней*) by the young Habsburg.¹¹⁷ The preserved sources reflect that the messenger of Leopold I of Habsburg was not willing to respect his different diplomatic rank. He, on the contrary, required the same treatment from the servants of Aleksey I Mikhailovich as it had been practiced with Allegretto Allegretti and the same consequential respect than he was actually ranked. The Russian party was though well aware of this difference

112 Lev Valentinovič ZABOROVSKIJ, *Последний шанс умиротворения: переговоры Б. А. Репнина во Львове 1653 г.*, in: B. N. Florja – L. J. Semenova (eds.), *Русская и украинская дипломатия*, pp. 24–30, here pp. 26–27.

113 *К 400-летию Дома Романовых. Монархии и династии в истории Европы и России: Сборник материалов международной научной конференции I*, St. Petersburg 2013.

114 Jiří LOUDA – Michael MACLAGAN, *Lines of Succession: Heraldry of the Royal Families of Europe*, London 1995⁴, Table No. 137, p. 274; S. LAMBERTZ, *Das diplomatische Zeremoniell*, p. 27.

115 W. LEITSCH, *Moskau*, p. 200; L. SVOBODA, *Diplomatické vzťahy*, pp. 46–47.

116 Garrett MATTINGLY, *Renaissance diplomacy*, Boston 1971, pp. 64–65; W. J. ROOSEN, *The Age of Louis XIV*, pp. 59–64; K. MÜLLER, *Das kaiserliche Gesandtschaftswesen*, pp. 116–124; J. HRBEK, *Postavení diplomata*, pp. 226–228; Heidrun R. I. KUGELER, “Le Parfait Ambassadeur”. *The Theory and Practice of Diplomacy in the Century following the Peace of Westphalia*, Oxford 2006 (Dissertation thesis), pp. 101–108; O. G. AGEEVA, *Дипломатический церемониал*, pp. 40–49.

117 More about this in the Letter by an unknown secretary or writer of the Privy Council addressed to Ferdinand Sigismund Kurz of Senftenau dated on 2. 6.: “*Ihr Mayestät befohlen, daß mir hocher her [...] hern Valderode [Johann Walderode of Eckenhausen] sagen solle, daß er ein schreiben an den von Fragstein stellen solle, darinen ihme imperative befohlen [!] werde, weilen er khein gesandter sonder nuhr also geschikter ist, ohne replie die 4000...*” ÖStA Wien, HHStA, Staatenabteilungen, Russland I, Kart. 9, Konv. 3, fol. 93.

and accordingly to that he was also dealt with.¹¹⁸ Their behaviour, which was mostly resulting namely from the different perception of his rank, was by Johann Christoph of Fragstein considered as an offence against his person and reputation as well as against his master – Leopold I of Habsburg – whom he represented there.¹¹⁹ When he objected to such acting, he was firmly reprovved. According to the tsar’s commissioners, it was highly inappropriate to lecture them and require anything at all. He should have got acquainted with all the customs including the ceremonial rules of the Moscow court before entering the Russian country, as the other diplomats did. Doing so, he could have avoided the occurred misunderstandings.¹²⁰

The mutual conflicts, persistence and final failure of the diplomatic mission of Johann Christoph of Fragstein were most likely determined yet by another fact reflected in the preserved sources. The servant of Leopold I of Habsburg had also worked as an imperial resident in the Rzeczpospolita – a country with which the Grand Duchy of Moscow had strained relations in spite of temporary peace.¹²¹ His close contacts with the Polish royal court, John II Casimir and many other (noble) persons from the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth were in Moscow seen as suspicious, supposing that Fragstein could promote also the interests of Russian enemies instead of those of the young Habsburg.¹²² But also by Fragstein there can be noted a certain aversion to the long journey heading to rather an exotic and for West-Europeans unknown country in which he could also lose his life in an extreme case.¹²³ He after all hesitated to set off for the diplomatic mission till Leopold I of Habsburg assertively urged him to leave at last himself.¹²⁴

118 In contrast to the former diplomat, there was not arranged any banquet after the inaugural audience which the tsar would personally take part in. He was delivered the dishes and drinks from the Grand-Duchy kitchen by a butler Andrej Ivanovich Chilkov who acted only on behalf of his master. *Памятники дипломатических сношений*, pp. 787–790; I. SCHWARCZ, *Отношения Габсбургов с Россией и Украиной*, p. 259; C. GARNIER, “*Wer meinen Herrn ehrt, den ehre ich billig auch*”, p. 39.

119 More about this in details in the Final report by Johann Christoph of Fragstein dated on 18. 6. 1658. BUW, Oddział Starych Druków, akcesja 1988.16, Fragstein, fol. 1–19.

120 *Памятники дипломатических сношений*, p. 836.

121 L. BITTNER – L. GROSS, *Repertorium*, pp. 159, 161; I. SCHWARCZ, *Die diplomatischen Beziehungen*, p. 33; Monika HRUŠKOVÁ, *Každodenní život císařských vyslanců v Polsku v druhé polovině 17. století*, České Budějovice 2012 (Diploma thesis), pp. 14, 45–54.

122 *Памятники дипломатических сношений*, p. 863. Comp. the Letter by Johann Christoph of Fragstein to Johann Adolf of Schwarzenberg dated on 12. 6. 1657. SOA Třeboň, oddělení Český Krumlov, RA Schwarzenberků, fasc. 373, fol. 782.

123 The Letter by Johann Christoph of Fragstein to Leopold I of Habsburg dated on 12. 6. 1657 and his Letter to Johann Morand Girardin dated on 22. 6. 1657. ÖStA Wien, HHStA, Staatenabteilungen, Russland I, Kart. 9, Konv. 3, fol. 98 and ibidem, Polen I, Kart. 69, Konv. Juni, fol. 57–58.

124 The Letter draft by Leopold I of Habsburg to Johann Christoph of Fragstein dated on 2. 6. 1657 and Letter dated on 7. 6. 1657. Ibidem, Russland I, Kart. 9, Konv. 3, fol. 96, 97.

The mentioned reluctance is clearly reflected in Fragstein's letters and other preserved documents. There can be seen contemporary the stereotypical West-Europeans' imaginings of the "Muscovites" which were of throughout negative forms.¹²⁵ According to Fragstein, they were very aggrieved, arrogant and aggressive individuals who did not impeach the other side at all during negotiations and were putting their own opinions through together with imposing their subjective views upon any terms, including force. Any reproach addressed to them was on the contrary considered as a defamation of character, so they demanded an immediate satisfaction and apology.¹²⁶ Fragstein also repeatedly labelled them as a crude and ill-mannered nation that was not familiar of good manners and did not respect the honour of others.¹²⁷

Another particular image, significantly reflected in Fragstein's texts, is represented by continuous references to the backwardness, ignorance and complete isolation of the Muscovite inhabitants from the rest of the world, especially the "cultivated and learned" West. To express his own civilization supremacy, he called the Muscovites names like "*gens Barbara*" or "*natio rustica*".¹²⁸ Fragstein thought that, except their mother tongue, this nation was not able to communicate in any foreign language, including Latin. That was why it was so difficult to make oneself understood there.¹²⁹ His broadminded smile was other times elicited in his view by absolutely incompetent and bizarre questions of tsar officials and officers about the election of Leopold I of Habsburg the Holy Roman

125 Here only selectively Gabriele SCHEIDEGGER, *Perverse Abendland – barbarisches Russland. Begegnungen des 16. und 17. Jahrhunderts im Schattenkulturellen Missverständnis*, Zürich 1993; Vsevolod Eugenovič BAGNO – Petr Romanovič ZABOROV – Nikolaj Nikolajevič SKATOV (eds.), *Образ России: Россия и русские в восприятии Запада и Востока*, St. Petersburg 1998; Stéphane MUND, *Orbis Russiarum. Genèse et développement de la représentation du monde „russe“ en Occident à la Renaissance*, Genève 2003; Valburga VAVŘINOVÁ, *Životní styl a kultura každodenního života ruské společnosti pozdního středověku očima Západoevropanů*, Praha 2009 (Dissertation thesis); Kateřina PRAŽÁKOVÁ, *Obraz Polsko-litevského státu a Ruska ve zpravodajství české šlechty (1450–1618)*, České Budějovice 2015.

126 More about this also in the Letter by Johann Christoph of Fragstein to Johann Adolf of Schwarzenberg dated on 11. 4. 1658. SOA Třeboň, oddělení Český Krumlov, RA Schwarzenberků, fasc. 373, fol. 731.

127 The Letter by Johann Christoph of Fragstein to Leopold I of Habsburg dated on 2. 1. 1658. ÖStA Wien, HHStA, Staatenabteilungen, Russland I, Kart. 10, Konv. 1, fol. 1–2. More about also in the Final report by Johann Christoph of Fragstein dated on 18. 6. 1658. BUW, Oddział Starych Druków, akcesja 1988.16, Fragstein, fol. 12; I. SCHWARCZ, *Отношения Габсбургов с Россией и Украиной*, pp. 297–298, document No. 17; Nancy SHIELDS KOLLMANN, *Was there Honor in Kiev Rus?*, *Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas* 36, 1988, pp. 481–492; EADEM, *Honor and Dishonor in Early Modern Russia*, *Forschungen zur osteuropäischen Geschichte* 46, 1992, pp. 131–146.

128 More about this in the detailed Final report by Johann Christoph of Fragstein dated on 18. 6. 1658. BUW, Oddział Starych Druków, akcesja 1988.16, Fragstein, fol. 1–19.

129 The Letter draft by Christoph Beuer of Binnen to Leopold I of Habsburg dated only by year 1658. ÖStA Wien, HHStA, Staatenabteilungen, Russland I, Kart. 10, Konv. 2, fol. 43–45. This fact was mentioned also by Allegretto Allegretti. I. SCHWARCZ, *Отношения Габсбургов с Россией и Украиной*, pp. 256, 258.

Emperor: “Namely, whether in case that Your Holy Royal Highness did not become the emperor, would he remain the Hungarian and Bohemian king? Or whether the one who was elected the emperor, would also possess the mentioned kingdoms at the same time? Thereupon, I gave a little smile and asked if I could answer by giving the same question: ‘If the Spanish or French king had not become the emperor, would that one, who would be elected instead of him, have become the future king of Spain or France?’ I believe that they could recognize the inappropriateness of their ridiculous thought as they proceeded to another topic of the conversation after a moment of silence.”¹³⁰

Conclusion

The preserved documents of the Habsburg diplomats in Moscow in the mid-17th century offer an interesting source for understanding the intellectual world and value hierarchy of both them and the other side, mostly the tsar’s commissioners and officers who the Mid-Europeans got in contact with. As there was suggested above, the interaction of both worlds different in terms of intellectual categories and values did not proceed in calm and harmonic way at all; rather conversely. The indivisible part of their mutual interaction, including political discussions, was constituted by numerous misunderstandings which often resulted in bitter arguments and lengthy disputes between the both parties. Namely these conflict situations and their final conclusions were significantly projected in the following Mid-Europeans’ negative views of particular Moscow court officials and the tsar army officers. The Habsburg diplomats although did not regard this bounded group of individuals as a mixed group of individual characters, but as the common representatives of the Russian Tsardom (the Grand Duchy of Moscow). These people were characterized by certain features typical also for all the inhabitants of the mentioned state.¹³¹

The construction of the image of the Muscovites and their ceremonial and ritual practices in the perspective of the delegates of Ferdinand III and Leopold I of Habsburg

130 “*Utrum scilicet casu, quo Sacra Regia Vestra Maiestas non fieret imperator, nihilominus sit permansura rex Ungariae et Bohemiae? Respondi ego immixto temperato risu eandem esse in hoc puncto quaestionem, si interrogarem, an, si rex Hispaniae aut Galliae non sit futurus imperator, ille, qui alias crearetur imperator, sit futurus rex Hispaniae aut Galliae? Ex quo responso adverterunt, credo, ridiculae suae opinionis vanitatem, dum silentio interposito ad alium mox discursum transierunt.*” The Letter by Johann Christoph of Fragstein to Leopold I of Habsburg dated on 25. 2. 1658. ÖStA Wien, HHStA, Staatenabteilungen, Russland I, Kart. 10, Konv. 1, fol. 47–52; A. WALEWSKI, *Historia wyzwolenia II*, pp. LIX–LX; I. SCHWARCZ, *Отношения Габсбургов с Россией и Украиной*, pp. 298–299, document No. 18.

131 Martin SCHEUTZ – Harald TERSCH, *Individualisierungsprozesse in der Frühen Neuzeit? Anmerkungen zu einem Konzept*, Wiener Zeitschrift zur Geschichte der Neuzeit 1, 2001, No. 2, pp. 38–59, here p. 51.

can be comprehended as searching for the “Self” in the “Other”. The above-mentioned personal testimonies reveal much more about the personalities of the diplomats themselves than about Aleksey I Mikhailovich and his tsar clerks and officers. In the view of “those other” and “different” persons there is encoded the capacity of self-awareness, personal problems and aspirations.¹³² The approach of Allegretto Allegretti, Johann Dietrich of Lorbach, Johann Christoph of Fragstein and Christoph Beuer of Binen arose from the way how they perceived the Muscovites. They based their comparisons on the premise that the Slavic nation was formed by people of equal rights, therefore they did not hesitate to measure them using their own hierarchy of values. So the Habsburg diplomats tried to match their value systems with the general one which was at the same time generalized on the basis of West-European values, neglecting the East-European value system.¹³³

There was only little attention of the diplomats paid to the matters that resembled their homeland, corresponded with their upbringing and education and fitted their personal experience together with expected behaviour patterns.¹³⁴ On the contrary, even a slightest stray of the tsar or his servants from conventionally regarded practice was seen as negative. The Habsburg diplomats categorized the observed events by choosing certain self-relative features based on their own experience framework. As they were not able to understand any stray from their previous experience, they condemned it. The “Other” meant for them the new and unknown which the Mid-Europeans encountered for the first time and which differed from their present experience. They were predicating the observed objects features of mostly negative evaluation. Because of choosing only particular aspects of the observed events which they considered to be typical, the diplomats contributed to strengthen the so far present stereotypes.¹³⁵ In their eyes the “Muscovites” were constructed as the “others” getting a lower value by which the Habsburg delegates strengthened their own status (in case of Fragstein there also could have been involved a kind of effort to

132 Winfried SCHULZE, *Die Entstehung des nationalen Vorurteils. Zur Kultur der Wahrnehmung fremder Nationen in der europäischen Frühen Neuzeit*, in: Wolfgang Schmale – Reinhard Stauber (eds.), *Menschen und Grenzen in der Frühen Neuzeit*, Berlin 1998, pp. 23–49, here p. 24–25, 36–37.

133 Michael ROHRSCHEIDER – Arno STROHMEYER (eds.), *Wahrnehmungen des Fremden. Differenzenerfahrungen von Diplomaten im 16. und 17. Jahrhundert*, Aschendorff – Münster 2007.

134 Michèle LAMONT – Virág MOLNÁR, *The Study of Boundaries in the Social Sciences*, *Annual Review of Sociology* 28, 2002, pp. 167–195, here p. 168; Csaba SZALÓ, *Transnacionální migrace. Proměny identit, hranic a vědění o nich*, Brno 2007, p. 84.

135 Jan BERTING – Christiane VILLAIN-GANDOSSI, *The Role and Significance of National Stereotypes in International Relations. An Interdisciplinary Approach*, in: Teresa Walas (ed.), *Stereotypes and Nations*, Kraków 1995, pp. 13–27.

excuse the failure of his mission). The preserved documents by the diplomats reveal a process of distancing from the constructed image on the basis of comparison and analogies together with searching for the “self” and labelling the “otherness”.¹³⁶

136 Alois WIERLACHER – Corinna ALBRECHT, *Kulturwissenschaftliche Xenologie*, in: Ansgar Nünning – Vera Nünning (eds.), *Konzepte der Kulturwissenschaften. Theoretische Grundlagen – Ansätze – Perspektiven*, Stuttgart 2003, pp. 280–306; Wolfgang REINHARD, *Historische Anthropologie frühneuzeitlicher Diplomatie. Ein Versuch über Nuntiaturberichte 1592–1622*, in: M. Rohrschneider – A. Strohmeyer (eds.), *Wahrnehmungen des Fremden*, pp. 53–72, here p. 58.